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 / FOREWORD
Mr Justice R.N.J. Purvis,
Family Court of Australia.
Member of Advisory Committee of
Institute of Criminology and Co-
Convenor of Seminar.
Is it now a Foreward or a Conclusion that should be written?
The series of seminars, Crime and the Professions, conceived some years ago by
the Advisory Committee to the Institute was intended to dealin some depth with the ,
problems besetting professional people, medical, legal and accounting, in the context
of their responsibility to their patients, clients, and the community at large. Allegations
of over-servicing, of trust account violations, of negligence and of fraudulent conduct
have all been made against the professionals. It was sought to have an airing of these
matters, and others, in an endeavour to see if the incidence was truly as alleged or
otherwise. If it be so, then, what steps should be taken to alleviate the problems or at
least minimise their consequences? What might be done as to cause, assuming that the
same could be identiﬁed?
In Forewards to the seminars on the medical profession and the legal profession“ I
sought to summarise the themes running through the papers presented and the
discussion held. I do not intend to repeat what I there said Suffice here to say that self
analysis may not have done any one of the professions harm, be it that there was
revealed a greater conscientiousness of dissension within than an awareness of disquiet
without
To the accountancy profession the seminar provided an opportunity for analysis
of issues seen by it and by its observers to be relevant and important. As they emerged,
the principle questions raised were:
Is there a capacity within the profession to effectively implement and operate a
system of self regulation?
Is the “job being done” by the auditor, the auditing specialist of the accountancy
profession, the job that the community expects to be done?
Are the offices of members of the profession knowlingly or otherwise being used as
a repository of documents evidencing fraud and thence, perhaps, beyond the call
of a search warrant?
What role should the auditor and the profession play in detecting fraud and is it
appropriate and “fair” for the audit opinion to be regarded as an insurance against
risk?
The answers generally as given to these questions were in the negative.
The Chairman of the New South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission, Mr
Cooke, looked back over the preceding five years to an occasion in 1980 when he
expressed the view that.
A declinein public confidence1n the profession1n Australia had been fed by a
series of reports of special investigations into well publicised company failures,
‘. Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. No. 50, Crime and the Professions— The Provision ofMedical services. N.S.W.
Govt. Printer I982.
Syd. Inst. Crim. Proc. No. 55, Crime and the Professions— The Legal Profession, N. S. W. Govt. Printer.
1983.
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some individual convictions, and regular critical comment of accountants to the
point where the prospect of continued self-regulation as then enjoyed in this
country seemed then to be remote (page 13)
He now says that he sees no reason to be less concerned with the issues then raised
added to which was, and is, a need to carefully assess the potential impact on
independence resulting from the provision, by auditors, of non-audit related services.
He continued in his paper by emphasising that auditors:
. need to be and to be seen to be independent of the client the auditor is
expected to have a wider concern than the interest of the client company and to
accept responsibility for anonymous users of the financial statements upon which ,
he reports. This is despite the fact that the client company alone provides the
renumeration to the auditor. (page I 7)
Can the accounting bodies then say that the question of independence is not a
problem in Australia? If it is a problem, Mr Cooke contended, is enough being done to
avoid any resulting loss of public confidence in the integrity of ﬁnancial statements?
Mr Cooke concluded by suggesting that a public demonstration of the auditor’s
credibility might not be too much to expect. Peer review on the American model may,
in his view, he the answer.
The former Auditor-General for New South Wales, Mr O’Donnell, identiﬁed the
more commonly considered auditor-related crime as “White Collar Crime” but in
questioning whether auditors can, as the public seem to expect, hold back the tide of
crime and if so, is it their responsibility, asked:
Is it any less reprehensible for management or other “smart” operators to deprive
you of the value of your shares by milking the assets of a company through chains
of other companies; or to “collapse” an enterprise by mismanagement How far
removed from criminality (if it is at all removed) is the making of exhorbitant
profits by using a monopoly to over-price? or stealing customer details or
manufacturer’s secrets by tapping computer systems? or bribing officials to
approve what they ought not to approve? or polluting the environment to save the
cost of proper disposal? (page 25)
To what extent, Mr O’Donnell asked, is the auditing profession under any
obligation to find and / or to report incidents of these extended forms of crime?
Mr O’Donnell raised the ogre of social accountability and whether the company
and hence, its shareholders, should be expected to meet the cost of extending “the writ
to protect society at large”. In the final analysis he asked, who pays? Should it be the
shareholders in the form of audit fees, creditors, investors and others who lose their
funds, the auditors (and their insurance companies), or the society as a whole through
the burden of crime? With reference to control, Mr O’Donnell was of the View that
society was heading for rigid control of what is in the accounts and of the auditor’s
duties.
Chief Inspector Sing of the Australian Federal Police was of the view that an
accountant could maintain a claim of legal professional privilege in respect of
documents held for a client during the execution of a search warrant on the
accountant’s office. It was his view that an accountant or a police officer, or indeed
anybody acting in the interests of the person in whom the privilege resides, can
maintain a claim of legal professional privilege providing that claim is made outside
the court room. The observations presented by Inspector Sing were an attempt, so he
said, to lay down some guidelines to be followed by police officers, lawyers and
accountants with a view to resolving disputes arising out of claims of legal professional
privilege during the execution of search warrants.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia was represented by Mr K.J.
Rennie, a member of its New South Wales State Council, who laid stress on the
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litigation past and present affecting accountants and its impact on the profession and
the cost of audits. He said that unless some form of limitation of liability is achieved
that partners in accounting firms would take the obvious course of not insuring at all
“while at the same time divesting themselves of all major assets”. It was Mr Rennie’s
view that the growing burden of unlimited liability placed upon accountants would
otherwise become a severe deterrent to the development of the public practice sector of
the accountancy profession, the same to the serious detriment of the investing public.
One of the difficulties faced by the profession, Mr Rennie commented, is trying to
bridge the gap between the auditor’s understanding of his duties and the public’s and
directors’ and shareholders’ perception of what is involved in a modern audit. He
thought that the profession must face up to the fact that very few shareholders and a
great number of directors would have very little, if any, understanding of the
complexities of a modern audit. He also, in the context of his observations as to cost,
raised the issue of audits being put out for tender and whether this practise was likely to
affect the independence of the auditor.
In the circumstances Mr Rennie asked whether it was fair and equitable for the
audit opinion to be regarded as an insurance against risk. He said no. Asking the
question as to whether some limitation of liability should be faced by auditors, he said
yes.
The commentators on the papers and opening observations were varied and
disclosed a measure of sectional interest Perhaps Mr Shields QC struck the right
chord when, in his intervention, he said:
It matters not whether it is a primary or secondary duty, if fraud exists, it is the
duty of the auditor to uncover it (pages 69- 70).
Mr Shields stated that it was his belief that the public expected those who
undertook duties as auditors to be absolutely independent, to be thoroughly
competent in their chosen profession, to be thoroughly knowledgeable in the proper
and current procedures in relation to auditing, to be painstaking in the carrying out of
those duties, no matter whether the fee agreed upon is adequate to cover the work they
will ultimately have to perform, and to act honestly towards those to whom they owe a
duty of care. There was also an expectation on them to comply with the ethical
standards of their respective professions. Mr Shields believed that whilst the
profession does an admirablejob amongst its own individual bodies, it cannot regulate
itself as a whole and whilst one may deprecate the bureaucratic interference spoken of
at the seminar, Mr Shields was of the view that there should be some form of regulation
of the profession as a whole and some form of disciplinary proceedings as opposed to
mere liability at common law.
The State Chairman of the Institute of Chartered Accountants expressed
disappointment at the absence of discussion referable to the notion of limitation of
liability. He did not think “that the official position of the professional bodies is that
they want to avoid liability as much as limit it to a practicable amount, an amount
which can be provided against and which would be a reasonable thing both from the
point of view of the consumer of the services as well as the person attempting to carry
out the services.” (page 77). .
It was left to Dr Stein of the Faculty of Law of the University of Sydney to
challenge the profession and ask “how can you, as professional people, say that you
have a right to limit by incorporation your liability to people who use and rely on your
services for the incompetence ofyour own actions, that you will be responsible only to
a certain ﬁgure?” (page 79).
The seminar did not answer so many of the questions raised, but it did highlight
attitudes and positions. As with the legal and medical professions, it may be said that in
order to attempt to rectify an undesirable situation, or solve a problem, one needs to
12
not only appreciate the causes and manifestations of it, but also the attitudes and
practices that might hinder or assist in devising any remedy.
The seminars have surely assisted to this end.
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CAN ACCOUNTANTS REGULATE THEMSELVES?
J. C. Cooke, Chairman,
New South Wales Corporate,
Affairs Commission
In a paper I presented to the Members Congress of the Queensland Branch of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants 5 years ago entitled “Challenge to the Profession in
the 80’s through Regulation”, I referred to developments in the immediately preceding
years in the United States where there had been considerable pressure for increased
government regulation of the accounting profession, and suggested that unless the
profession in this country is seen to actively and effectively regulate itself, a closer
involvement at government level was almost inevitable.
A decline in public confidence in the profession in Australia had been fed by a
series of reports of special investigations into well publicised company failures, some
individual convictions, and regular critical comment of accountants to the point where
the prospect of continued self regulation as then enjoyed in this country seemed then to
be remote. Of particular concern was the lack of any warning signals in financial
statements and/ or audit reports of impending collapses.
I suggested that there appeared to be two main areas in which'the profession was
most vulnerable and in which the degree of government intervention during the 80’s
would depend upon the extent to which the profession could regain public confidence.
I was referring to the question of the auditors independence from the client
company and the lack of universally accepted and enforceable accounting standards,
leading to a disturbing degree of non-complaince as evidenced by qualiﬁed audit
reports.
Government intervention in the form of the Accounting Standards Review Board
has since emerged in relation to the latter area of concern. I will consider the issue of
independence in the light of happenings in the intervening years and proceed to
consider the question of regulation generally.
Independence of Auditors
In considering this question in my 1980 paper, I drew attention to the Joint
Accounting Bodies Statement of Auditing Standards, AUSl, paragraph 3 of which
then stated: .
the main objective of the normal company audit is the expression of an
independent professional opinion on the truth and fairness of the accounts
presented to shareholders,
and to paragraph 13 which then went on to declare that
an auditor must maintain an independent outlook and allow nothing to impair his
independence, -
while paragraphs 14 and 15 acknowledged that the auditor must not only be
independent but must also appear to be independent.
The accounting bodies have since re-issued AUSl which “describes the basic
principles which govern the auditor’s professional responsibilities and which must be
complied with whenever an audit is carried out.” Paragraph 14 deals with “Integrity,
Objectivity and Independence”. It states:
The auditor should be straightforward, honest and sincere in his approach to his
, professional work. He must be fair and must not allow prejudice or bias to
override his objectivity. He should maintain an impartial attitude and both be, and
appear to be, free of any interest which might be regarded, whatever its actual
effect, as being incompatible with integrity and objectivity.
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The accounting bodies have also introduced new ethical rulings relating to
professional independence.
AERIO (The Institute of Chartered Accountants) and AEPlO (The Australian
Society of Accountants) set the scene with paragraphs dealing with ethical principles:
Professional independence is a concept fundamental to the accountancy
profession requiring a member to observe integrity in and an objective approach
to professional work.
Paragraph 6 develops this theme:
In each professional assignment he undertakes, a member in public practice shall
both be and be seen to be free of any interest which is incompatible with
objectivity. This is self evident in the exercise of the reporting function the
criterion should be whether a reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant
facts and taking into account the conduct of the member and his behaviour under
the circumstances, could conclude that the member has placed himself in a
position where his objectivity would or could be impaired.
Various ethical rules deal with specific situations without limiting the generality of the
ethical principles quoted above.
The main point of concern expressed in my 1980 address was the auditor’s
independence from the inﬂuence of the client company, whether in fact or in
appearance, which would manifest itself in a close relationship with an officer or
officers of the client, and/ or a reliance by the auditing firm, on income derived from
other, non auditing, services provided to the client. I can see no reason to be less
concerned with these issues now than I was 5 years ago.
The provision of management advisory or management consulting services
(defined in APS8 as “the rendering of professional services in the course of assisting or
advising clients in any aspects of business management ...”), to an audit client by an
auditing firm, was the cause of considerable concern in the United States during the
19703. This concern had been expressed by the professional body, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), and later elaborated upon by
politicians through the Metcalf Senate Sub-committee in 1977, a Senate Staff Report,
and again by the AICPA through the Cohen Commission which reported in 1978.
All this interest encouraged a programme of increased self regulation by the
profession in the United States which resulted in the creation, by the AICPA, of a
division for CPA firms, as distinct from individual members, and the sub-division of
that division into two sections — the SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies
Practice Section. The Public Oversight Board, (POB) which was formed to oversee the
activities of the SEC Practice Section for CPA firms, published a report in March 1979
on the scope of services by CPA firms. The various reports all acknowledged the
potential for impairing independence that derived from the provision of management
advisory or management consulting services by an audit firm to the client company.
In 1974 an AICPA study concluded that significant benefits to society, to the
audit, and to the client ﬂow from public accountants furnishing these non-audit related
services, and that the possibility that independence may be, or may appear to be,
impaired was not sufﬁciently great to warrant their proscription. The Cohen
Commission, an independent Commission formed by the AICPA, published its report
in 1978. While not prepared to recommend proscription of specific services, this
Commission did register concern that rendering such services continued to appear to
impair independence.
Earlier, the Senate Staff Report had concluded generally that auditors involved
themselves in a conflict of interest in furnishing management consulting services to
audit clients since it necessarily involved the firms the business operations of their
corporate clients. That Senate Staff Report was the basis for a report in 1977 by the
  
15  Metcalf Senate Sub-committee which concluded that accounting firms should
perform for audit clients only services related to accounting. The only management
advisory / consulting services it believed appropriate were “providing certain computer
and system analyses necessary for improving internal control procedures of
corporations.”
In 1978 the SEC required public companies to reveal details of non-audit services
performed for them by their auditors, and the percentage relationship offees incurred
for such services to total fees incurred for services performed in connection with the
audit. It also required comment on whether the directors approved of the services and
whether they had considered the effects of such services on the auditor’s independence.
The purpose of the rule (ASR 250) was to provide users of financial information
with data upon which they could better understand and evaluate relationships between
companies and their auditors, and to provide the SEC with an empirical data base
upon which to assess the then existing extent of the practice. This rule was strongly
opposed by major accounting firms, which maintained that audit and non—audit
services are kept at arms length within their firms without placing their independence
in fact in jeopardy.
Former SEC Chairman, Harold Williams, had previously maintained that even
though no erosion of independence may actually occur, the appearance of a close
relationship was damaging the accounting profession in the eyes of the public.
However, in keeping with the general administration, the SEC abandoned the rule in
1982, on the basis that it was no longer necessary, and that adequate self regulatory
mechanisms existed to monitor non-audit services.
The SEC had also, following the PCB Report in 1979, issued a release (ASR 264)
on the “Scope of Services by Independent Accountants” presenting its views on the
factors which should be considered by management, audit committees and
accountants in determining the appropriate scope of services to be provided by
independent accountants. The purpose was to encourage a careful assessment of the
potential impact on independence resulting from the provision, by auditors, of non-
audit related services. This release did not survive beyond 1981 when it was dropped on
the basis that it had served its purpose in alerting the accounting profession to the
independence problems, and that it had been the cause of a degree of confusion
resulting in companies arbitrarily denying their auditors non-audit related
appointments rather than risk infringing auditor independence. It is clear that the SEC
has concluded that in the absence of direct evidence of impairment of independence in
fact, sufficient control over the provision of non audit related services can be imposed
from within- the profession. A concern with the appearance of independence is not as
apparent now as it was under the present Chairman’s predecessor.
Following three successive and very comprehensive special reports by the SEC to
Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission’s Oversight Role in the
years 1978, 1979 and 1980, under the Chairmanship of Harold M. Williams, the SEC
opted to abandon that form of reporting in favour of the inclusion in its annual report
of a section dealing with “Accounting Matters” on the basis that its annual report to
Congress “is the appropriate forum in which to comment on the developments within
the accounting profession, and to assess the degree to which the profession is meeting
the challenge it faces”. In its 1981 Annual Report the SEC acknowledged that
significant progress had been made by the profession in implementing a meaningful
system of self regulation, the evolution of which the Commission “continues to actively
support”. In that Report the SEC reiterated its concern with the accounting principles
underlining the financial information disseminated by public companies, the auditing
standards by which it is reviewed, and the independence and compentency of the
revnewers.
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Each of the Annual Reports demonstrates a successively diminishing interest in
the effect upon an auditor’s independence ofthe scope of services question, which was
of such concern in previous years. Whether this represented an acknowledgement that
the profession’s self-regulatory program had succeeded in allaying any fears that the
profession was not capable of regulating itself in this respect, or that the concern of the
SEC with the role of the accounting profession in promoting public confidence in the
integrity and credibility of financial reporting had died with Chairman Williams, is
unclear. What is clear is that under Chairman Shad the SEC has taken a much more
relaxed attitude towards the scope of services provided to audit clients and to the
question of regulation of the accounting profession generally.
Earlier this year, in testifying before a Congressional Sub-committee on Oversight
and Investigation, SEC Chairman Shad claimed that less than 1% of more than 10,000
publicly held companies that report to the SEC could be described as audit failures and
that accordingly ”the system is working pretty well”. The SEC Chairman also defended
auditors from comments of sub-committee members that they face a potential conﬂict
of interest in providing non-accounting services to clients, claiming that auditors could
provide advice to clients without in any way infringing their independence as auditors.
The President of AICPA, Phillip B. Chenok, also testified and delivered a White
Paper on the quality of independent audits, dealing amongst other things with the
concept of auditor independence. He advised the sub-committee, predictably, that the
accounting profession is committed to standards of excellence and integrity and that
there is no need for additional federal regulation of the profession.
The Sub—committee Chairman, Rep. John Dingell, obviously felt otherwise. He
compared accountants to ‘sorcerers’ who use smoke, make incantations and then tell
the public “all is well”. He added that “the system doesn’t seem to be working” and
claimed the corporate community needs “an independent umpire”.
“It is not enough that financial statements be accurate; the public must also
perceive them as being accurate. Public faith in the reliability of financial
statements depends upon public perception of the outside auditor as an
independent professional”, the Chairman claimed.
A ban on the provsion of non audit services to audit clients was recommended by
Professor Briloff of Baruch College, City University of New York. He claimed that the
accounting profession “has abandoned its traditional professional role on behalf of
society in favour of the more glistening coin of management advisory and tax
consultative services, and in this hot pursuit of Mammon they have transmuted its rich
heritage into a commodity”. Professor Briloff proposed that the audit function be
separated from management advisory services in relation to publicly owned companies
by requiring firms that derive at least 50% of their revenues from auditing public
companies to divest thmselves of non-audit related activities. He claimed this would
eliminate the practice of “low-balling” where an unrealistically low bid for an audit
engagement is made in the expectation of providing the client with remunerative
non-audit related services. This practice may not be entirely unrelated to “audit
tendering” in Australia. Robert Chatov, Professor of Economics at State University of
New York at Buffalo suggested the problems might be overcome by the appointment
of government auditors.
Given current thinking on the SEC, and subject to the outcome of the as yet
incomplete Dingell Sub-committee, the heat appears to be off the accounting
profession in the United States, but the question is obviously far from settled. All the
platitudes in the world cannot disguise the fact that an auditor must both be, and be
seen to be, independent of the client company. Anything that impinges on the fact or
the appearance of independence must affect public confidence in the audit function of
the accounting profession. The quasi-judicial nature of that function ensures that any
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such lack of confidence must ultimately have a serious effect upon the capital rais
ing
process.
That auditors need to be, and to be seen to be, independent ofthe client is a unique
aspect of the accountancy profession. The auditor is expected to have a wide conc
ern
than the interests of the client company and to accept responsibility for anonymo
us
users of the financial statements upon which he reports. This is despite the fact
that the
client company alone provides the remuneration to the auditor.
In the well known case Candler -v— Crane Christmas, Lord Denning said:
There is a great difference between the lawyer and the accountant. The lawyer is
never called upon to express his personal belief in the truth of his client’s case;
whereas the accountant who certifies the accounts of his client‘is always called on
to express his personal opinion as to whether the accounts exhibit a true and
correct view of his client’s affairs; and he is required to do this, not so much for the
satisfaction of his own client, but more for the guidance of shareholders, investors,
revenue authorities and other who may have to rely on the accounts in serious
matters of business.
The need for independence in fact is universally accepted, at least in theory, in
order to ensure the credibility of financial statements. But the need to be independent
in fact is only marginally more important than the need to appear to be independent. It
is this latter concept to which little more than lip service appears have been paid, not
only in this country but also in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.
If an auditor is not independent in fact, how can the report be relied upon? His
opinion is no more reliable than the directors statements. Even if the auditor is
independent in fact, unless he is also seen to be independent, public confidence in
auditing, and hence the profession of accounting, must be diminished.
The Companies Act and Codes deal with the question of independence to a limited
extent in this country.
A person is precluded from the auditing function if indebted to the client company
or a related corporation in an amount exceeding $5,000, and is also precluded, other
than in relation to an exempt proprietary company, if the person is an officer of the
company, or a partner employer or employee of an officer; or a partner or employee of
an employee of an officer (8.277(1)).
In the case of a firm, no member and no corporation in which any member is a
substantial shareholder can be indebted to the client company in an amount exceed
ing
$5,000, and, other than in relation to an exempt proprietary company, no mem
ber of
the firm can be a partner, employer or employee of an officer of the client company, or
a partner or employee of an employee of an officer of the client company. In additi
on,
no officer of the client company can receive any remuneration from the firm for act
ing
as a consultant to it on accounting or auditing matters. (5.277(2)). In the case of
the
appointment of a firm as auditor, it is relevant to note that each person who
is a
member of the firm and is a registered company auditor, is deemed to be appoi
nted as
auditor. Therefore, it is not only the independence of the partner performing the au
dit
that is of concern. Otherwise, independence and the appearance thereof is presentl
y a
matter for ethical rulings of the professional bodies, which do not appear to h
ave
shown any more enthusiasm in this country than have their counterparts in the U
SA or
the UK for grasping the nettle.
The provision of management consulting services to audit clients is acknowledged
in paragraph 24 of AERIO and AEPlO:
When providing management consultancy services to an audit client, a practice
or
a person in the practice must not participate in the executive function of that
client. Decision making is part of the duties of the board of directors and
management of a company and not its auditors.
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This principle is also expressed in APS8, a Statement of Management Consulting
Service Standards issued by the Joint Accounting Bodies.
Schedule 7 of the Companies Regulations acknowledges the fact that non-audit
services are provided to audit clients by requiring disclosure of the remuneration
received or due and receivable by auditors for services other than auditing. In
providing that an auditor cannot be removed from office otherwise than by resolution
of the company at a general meeting ofwhich special notice has been given (8.282), the
Companies Act and Codes have strengthened the auditors position. An auditor
therefore should not feel that the appointment might be placed in jeopardy through
insistence upon independence in fact and in appearance. Thus one ofthe principal fears
in the USA, that an auditor who is over zealous in his desire for independence can very
promptly be made very independent, is not such a problem in Australia.
But the underlying question appears just as relevant in Australia as elsewhere.
Should an auditor be permitted to impair his independence, or the appearance of
independence, from the client company by becoming involved in other lucrative
engagements, unrelated to the audit function, for that client? Can the accounting
bodies say that this is not a problem in Australia? If it is not a problem, why is it not? If
it is a problem, is enough being done to avoid any resulting loss of public confidence in
the integrity of financial statements? ~
Is it enough for the professional bodies to say, as they do in paragraph 6 of AERIO
and AEPlO, that “a member in public practice shall be and be seen to be free of any
interest which is incompatible with objectivity the criterion being whether a
reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant facts and taking into account the
conduct of the member and his behaviour under the circumstances, could conclude
that the member has placed himself in a position where his objectivity would or could
be impaired”? Is this test consistent with the necessity to be seen to be independent?
And the specific ethical ruling dealing with management consulting services condones
the practice generally so long as it does not involve participation in the client’s
executive function.
Far from being concerned about any erosion of independence through the
provision by auditors to their audit clients of non-audit related services, the Institute,
at least, is actively promoting the fact that Chartered Accountants have been
progressively broadening the range of services offered to embrace a role as advisers to
business in the non-accounting arena. The Pacioli column in The Australian recently
proudly proclaimed that “While chartered accounting ﬁrms perform more than 90% of
public company audits, they also carry out more than half of the management
consulting assignments in Australia”, as evidence of the widening ambit of services
offered by Institute members. A marketing program has been launched to impress the
public with the involvement of chartered accountants in business success. This would
be all very well if only it didn’t involve a ﬁrm’s audit clients.
Accounting Standards
In the paper I referred to at the beginning of this address, I made reference to the
ten contemplated Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) which has since
become a reality. The need for universally accepted and legally enforceable accounting
standards is now generally accepted, but although the ASRB has been in existence
since January, 1984 we are yet to see an approved accounting standard, for a variety of
reasons which I understand and appreciate.
The accounting bodies have a very significant role to play in ensuring that the
ASRB performs the role intended for it. Apart from having a say in the composition of
the Board, the profession, through the Australian Accounting Research Foundation
(AARF), is the source of all standards presently under consideration, and will have
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significant input into any standard submitted to the ASRB from any other source. If
the ASRB is unable, for whatever reason, to produce approved accounting standards,
the Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities is likely to look for some
variation to the existing arrangement which might not depend so much upon the
professions participation.
Former NSW Attorney General, Mr Frank Walker, in an endowed lecture to the
Australian Society of Accountantsin 1982, in warning that the profession would need
to improve its self regulation if it was to avoid increasing intrusion by government,
said, amongst other things “I shudder to think of what would happen to our market
place if bureaucrats were empowered to set accounting standards ...”. The accounting
bodies have a vested interest in keeping we bureaucrats out of this particular field, and
the ASRB seems to be their best guarantee of continuing private sector involvement in
the standard setting process.
Peer Review as a Regulatory Tool ~
The single most significant elementin the voluntary self regulatory schemein the
United States, according to the SEC, is the “peer review” programme. This is a
phenomenon of the 1970s and involves an arrangement whereby a firm of auditors
subjects itself to a type of quality control audit by an independent firm of comparable
competence and experience.
Each member firm of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA Division
for CPA firms is required to submit itself to peer review each 3 years. It is the firm,
rather than the individual auditor which is reviewed, and the review does not turn upon
any allegation or suggestion of malpractice or substandard work. The review is
designed as an appraisal of audit capability directed towards quality control or audit
procedures and policies in the firm. The POB, which oversees the activities of member
firms of SECPS, regards peer review, without question, as the centrepiece of the
regulation program for the Division for CPA firms.
In my 1980 paper referred to earlier, I queried whether peer review, which at that
stage had not been comprehensively embraced by the profession in the United States,
would achieve the results confidently predicted for it by the SEC and by the PCB. At
that stage only ten reviews had been held and less than half the eligible firms were
members of the Practice Section, although the SEC had predicted that wide
acceptance would follow a reluctance by companies to appoint non-participating
firms.
The 1983 Annual Report of the SEC indicated that 426 accounting firms, which
audit 85% of all publicly held companies in the United States, had joined the SECPS.
Peer reviews were conducted of 144 ﬁrms during 1983 taking the total of reviews to in
excess of 500. Over 94% of firms reviewed in 1983 received an unqualified opinion.
This is an increase of 10% over the previous year and is seen by the PCB as “direct
evidence that the peer review process is improving the quality of practice of member
firms”. This perhaps is not the only conclusion which might be drawn.
A problem which was evident in the 1979 Report of the SEC, that of getting access
to the reviewers working papers, has been overcome in the intervening years by an
“access” arrangement entered into between the SECPS and the SEC. This has
increased the confidence of the SEC in the success of the peer review process. Given the
obvious reliance placed on peer view as an integral part of the self regulatory process in
the United States, the question that presents itself is “to what extent would such an
innovation assist the profession in Australia in regulating itself?” If some such means
of improving the quality of audits is necessary, is peer review as practiced in the United
States the answer?
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My reaction in 1980 was that, as an alternative to some form of government
intrusion, it would receive little support in this country. It suggested a mutual
backscratching exercise, which however well-intended, was destined to have nothing
more than a cosmetic effect. If the SEC, the PCB and the majority of commentators
are to be believed, my fears were groundless. If they are to be believed —— and it is only
the high proportion of unqualified reports that makes me wonder — then is there any
good reason why some such system should not be considered in Australia? I concede
that merely because peer review appears to have produced good results in the United
States it does not follow that it therefore ought to be introduced here. There are all
sorts of differences involving the regulatory, institutional and cultural environment
which might militate against the automatic application to Australia of any perceived
desirable practice in the USA.
But has it been clearly etablished that some such programme would be
inappropriate here? And can it be said that no independent appraisal of quality control
systems and tests of compliance with quality control policies and procedures are
necessary? Is there no need to demonstrate publicly the credibility, reliability and
satisfactory professional standards of any auditing firm?
I have been referred to a comment in the Arthur Young Journal in 1976 by William
Kananga who said:
While there is little doubt in my mind that the accounting profession would
eventually have arrived at the peer review concept under its own steam, it is equally
clear that we would not have reached that destination nearly so rapidly had it not
been for outside pressure. The rising tide of litigation against accounting firms in
recent years, which alleged poor auditing, and even in a few cases criminal
conduct, provided much of the pressure.
The rising tide of litigation in this country is having its effect. The professional
accounting bodies are very conscious of the status of their members and seek exclusive
right to the use of the title “Accountant”. Limited Liability for audit partners in firms is
sought through incorporation. These may be desirable objectives from one point of
view. But what does the public get in return?
I suggest some public demonstration of the auditors’ credibility might not be too
much to expect. Peer review, on the American model, may be the answer. Perhaps
there is a better answer more relevant to local conditions but I suggest that a growing
public expectation of some form of regulation of auditing practices directed towards
ensuring, so far as possible, that the risk of audit failure is reduced to minimal levels,
requires urgent attention by the profession. The alternative, from the point of view of
the private sector, may be too horrible to contemplate.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
J. C. Cooke,
My paper is essentially an update of a paper which I prepared some five years ago
for presentation to the Queensland Branch of the Institute. In that paper, which I
perceived then would provide challenges to the profession during the 1980’s, I
canvassed two particular areas: the question of the independence of an auditor from
the client’s company, and the then (and perhaps now) lack of universally and legally
enforceable accounting standards. These are areas which I suggested at that time
needed the attention of the profession.
In relation to the first area, the question of independence, I have obviously relied
largely on the United States experience. I have recounted developments in that country
in the years since, and compared them with the position in Australia. The major
problem that I see is reconciling the auditors’ generally accepted need to both be and be
seen to be independent of the client company, with the fact that the auditor may well
rely to some extent at least on income derived from the provision of services to the
client which are in no way related to the audit function. I give an indication of current
thinking at the SEC but not withstanding that, it is fairly clear that there is
considerable concern felt in the United States: for example, the Dingell sub-committee
referred to in the paper (seepage 16) considered that the profession in that country has
failed to come to grips with this problem.
In Australia the professional bodies have ethical rulings which I quote in the paper
and this is one point which I feel ought to be made. The ethical rulings state, and I
quote (page 18):
a member in public practice shall be and be seen to be free of any interest which is
incompatible with objectivity.
Having said that, the ethical rulings go on to describe as the criterion for determining
that perception whether a reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant facts
and taking into account the conduct of the member and his behaviour under the
circumstances, could conclude that the member has placed himself in a position where
his objectivity would or could be impaired. Is it not relevant also to consider the
perception formed in the minds of persons, whether reasonable or otherwise, who do
not have the knowledge of the relevant facts and who are not in a position to take into
account the member’s conduct and behaviour under the circumstances? It seems to me
that in the eyes of the general public the auditor needs to be seen to be independent but
may not meet this latter criterion, and that would seem to render the ethical rulings
AERIO and AEPlO largely meaningless.
I suggest in the paper that the professional accounting bodies need to look closely
at this problem and consider whether some firm action should be taken to restrict the
range of non-audit related services provided to the audit clients by the audit firms. The
growing practice of audit tendering, to which reference is made in Ken Rennie’s paper,
highlights this problem. An unrealistic low tender for an audit job must lead to the
presumption that the tenderer expects to be compensated by retaining the client’s
good-will and providing lucrative non-audit related services to that client and, given
that, the practice must surely effectively eliminate any competitor who takes seriously
his obligations to be and to be seen to be independent of the client company.
This problem is not confined to the USA, of course, or to Australia. I have found it
convenient to use the USA experience given the ready accessibility of material, but I
have noticed, since preparing the paper in The Accountant of 24th July 1985 there was
reported the comments of the International Chairman, Panell Kerr-Foster, at a
symposium at Birmingham which indicate a harder line than I have tentatively
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suggested in the paper. He said the auditor should not be allowed to provide any other
service to a client company:
With this separation of function should come a restoration of the strict
professional rules prohibiting tendering or otherwise seeking after audit
appointment. Only separation of function can offer true independence. Renewed
professional ethical rules should be monitored by disciplinary Committees with
outside members, so that justice may be seen to be done.
Closer to home, just in the last few weeks, the Business Review Weekly (6th
September 1985) reported a rap over the knuckles which was given by the Victorian
Division of the Society to its members. It drew specific attention to the ethical ruling I
quoted earlier and stated that far too many members in public practice lose their
independence in their association with clients. Far too often the position appears to
arise where a member foregoes his necessary professional and sometimes legal
obligations and tries to wet-nurse a client through his difficulties.
So the concern is not confined to me, of course, although until recently it might
have appeared to me to be so because there had been very little that I had seen of any
writings on this topic locally, although plenty in the United States and some (not very
much) in the UK. Where it has been noticed in the Corporate Affairs Commission is in
the reports of special investigations into the major company collapses. Many of them
point to some degree of collaboration between company officers and auditors in
preventing what it would seem to be unnecessary “waves” being caused to the
company, and when the pack of cards eventually falls it becomes very obvious that had
the auditor been more independent than he appeared to be the pack of cards would
have fallen a lot sooner to everyone’s advantage. It is a very real problem, and is one
that I canvass in the paper as I did in the paper ﬁve years ago. In fact, it seems to me that
it is that area that the professional ought to be coming to grips with more so than is
apparent.
The other topic raised in my paper relates to the accounting standards and the fact
that the Accounting Standard Review Board has now been established. I referred in
the previous paper to the need for the legally enforceable accounting standards — now
we are in a position where we are about to have some. In fact, only today,
18 September, two standards were published in the Commonwealth Gazette. One is
accounting policy disclosure and the other on events occurring after balance date. So
given the normal administrative procedures that have to be gone through, such as a
period within which the Ministerial Council may disallow — a period of some three
months or whatever period is specified in the notice as the starting date — we will have
the first legally enforceable approved accounting standards in Australia. The point I
seek to make in the paper is, that given the publicity recently given to the Accounting
Standards Review Board of what was perceived to have been its failure to produce
approved and enforceable accounting standards, that the profession might in its own
interests, I would think, seek to ensure that the Accounting Standards Review Board is
in a position to produce approved accounting standards. I am sure that this is the
attitude of the Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities which is responsibile
for the Accounting Standards Review Board, and whatever it does or does not do, it is
not likely to be particularly patient with a body which does not seem to be producing
anything. However, I think it is something of a misconception to suggest that the
Board is not producing anything as today’s events have established. But I think it is
only realistic to realise that if the Accounting Standards Review Board does not get the
cooperation that it needs in order to function effectively, the Ministerial Council may
well look for other ways of achieving this result and it may not be a method which is in
the best interests of the profession. The profession is, of course, represented through
persons it nominates, or it has been certainly until now, on the Accounting Standards
 
23
Review Board and it would be in its best interest to see that this position Continues.
The other topic I have covered in the paper is this question of peer review, which
deals with the review of one firm by another independent ﬁrm. I understand, although
I have not said so here, the larger international firms as a matter of practice have fairly
strict internal control procedures, whereby internally there is a review. But this, of
course, could be seen to be somewhat incestuous and the very strong expressions of
opinion on the American scene suggests that peer review is the real answer to the
successful administration of the accounting profession. Without that, the experience
there suggests very clearly that self-regulation would not succeed without peer review. I
simply put that in really for discussion as much as anything else. I cannot pretend to
know whether it will be a success here, given our differing conditions and there may be
something to be said for some such procedure not necessarily modelled exactly on the
American experience. But there again, I have not seen much by way ofdiscussion in the
Australian context on this type of review and that is something that the profession
might be encouraged to look at. There may be reasons why peer review is not
appropriate in this country. Of course, I realize the cost factor is one, but that is
something which might need to be borne if it is seen as necessary to demonstrate that
the accounting profession is efficiently and effectively regulating itself. There is
generally a recognition by the accounting bodies of a need for a degree of government
regulation and there is no doubt that there will continue to be such a need. But the
involvement of self-regulatory organisations themselves is essential to ensure effective
control of the profession and its members. The government is limited in what it can do,
and, in fact, in what it would want to do. As I pointed out in my paper, I think it is in the
interest of the profession generally, to see that whatever government control is
necessary is limited to what, in fact, is necessary. It does not need to go any further. So
that a system of co-regulation whereby the profession, the professional bodies and the
government regulatory authorities work together, seems to me to be the ideal solution.
While it works reasonably well now I feel that there are areas for improvement and
those that I touch upon in the paper are the ones that I would advocate.
24
CRIME, KING CANUTE AND THE AUDITING PROFESSION
J. 0’DonnellLL.B., F.A.S.A., C.P.A.
formerly Auditor-General, N.S.W.
Currently there is some churning in the accountancy profession at the implications
of Cambridge Credit. That case is rating public attention in another paper being
presented at this seminar. At the other end of the seminar list comes the question “Can
Accountants Regulate Themselves?” That, I guess, means should it be left to the
profession or should the Government step in (the Government being the body
answerable to the public through the Parliament and the electoral process). There have
been plenty of warnings from Government that if the profession doesn’t “get its house
in order” the Government will intervene. Frank Walker, as Attorney-General, said so
several times.
While ex-officio Chairman of the Public Accountants Registration Board I had
some experience of the pro’s and con’s of regulation of the profession by the
Government and by the profession. I suggest that the real question for this seminar is
whether the job being done by the auditing specialists of the accountancy profession is
the job the public expects.
In an endowed lecture to the Australian Society of Accountants in 1982 in
Queensland, Mr Walker said:
One of the most obvious symptoms of economic depression is the failure of
large corporations and businesses. The post mortems and recriminations that
follow such crashes focus attention on the published accountants, which as
Professor Chambers points out in his studies on accounting standards, frequently
appeared safe and sound shortly before the failure.
Public attitudes naturally harden in such cases and immense pressure is
exerted on politicians to take action.
Public opinion has also been moulded by the increasingly publicised spectacle
of wealthy professions being prosecuted. We are constantly being assailed in the
media with dramatic stories of doctors defrauding medibank, solicitors stealing
from their trust accounts, Stockbrokers accused of dishonesty in public capital
raising ventures and auditors sued for negligence.
Add to that the current scandals about lawyers and accountants engineering
fraudulent or immoral tax avoidance schemes and the stage has got to be set for
some responsible measures to put the Accountancy house in order.
The time has come for Accountants to stop swimming against the tide of social
concern. We have reached the point of decision on the vital questions that will
determine the role of the accounting profession in a changing society.
For some years now I have been pointing to trends in the USA, Canada and
Britain, predicting that both political and economic pressures will force us in the
same direction.
To be fair, his views included: “one would find it difficult tojustify a case for total
Government regulation of accountants. I shudder to think of what would happen to
our market place if bureaucrats were empowered to set accounting standards for
example.”
King Canute!
To me, there is a strong parallel in the present situation where accountants
(auditors) seem to be getting into hot water over crime — or quasi crime — and its
implications (e. g. “bottom of the harbour” and all that) and the circumstances which
put King Canute into cold water.
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I accept the theory that it was Canute’s Court — not the King — who proclaimed
the doctrine of his ability to do anything; and that Canute’s stand (or seat) on the beach
was intended to show that no mortal could hold back the tide by words alone. Of
course it is possible to block the onrush — but at a high cost of building walls or dams
— raising the question of what level of cost is justiﬁed.
It1s time to consider whether auditors can (as the public seemsto expect) hold
back the tide of crime and, if they can, is it their responsibility? And, in any case, who
will pay the cost?
Which Crimes?
When crime and the accountancy profession are linked in the mind, the tendency is
to see the topic as “white collar” crime — apparently on an assumption it’s only those
with coloured collars who engage in bank hold-ups, burglaries, race-horse ring-ins etc.
To some extent, white collar “crimes” (e.g. tax evasion) are even seen as clean — or as
part of some legitimate sporting contest (like litigation?). Only non-white collar crimes
are dirty!
The distinction may be sufficient to point up the main category of crime which has
some relativity to auditors’ work. We would all be sure that embezzling the petty cash,
padding the payroll, putting in phony invoices, are in this category of white collar
crime — together with all other employee activities which defraud the employer. But is
there any real difference between the results of those “crimes” and loss through
house-breaking of your video, cash orjewellery? More importantly for this discussion,
is there any real difference from losing a large slice of your asset base because an insider
manipulated share prices?
Again, is it any less reprehensible for management or other “smart” operators to
deprive you of the value of your shares by milking the assets of a company through
chains of other companies; or to “collapse” an enterprise by mismanagement —leaving
millions owed to unsecured creditors, but with those who brought about the collapse
being able to place their personal wealth beyond the reach of bankruptcy? How far
removed from criminality (if it is at all removed) is the making of exorbitant profits by
using a monopoly to overprice? or stealing customer details or manufacturers’ secrets
by tapping computer systems? or bribing officials to approve what they ought not
approve? or polluting the environment to save the cost of proper disposal?
To what extent is the auditing profession under any obligation to find and / or to
report incidents of these extended forms of crime? For example, if analysis of costs
shows an abnormal drop in waste disposal costs, should the auditor check whether
proper procedures have been followed! If improper practices are found — with
attendant risks to society and the environment — where does the auditor’s duty run?
To the Board of Directors (who settled the terms of the engagement letter); to the
proprietors (who would have to bear the cost of remedy or fines); to society at large (of
which the auditor is part) which has no privity of contract with the auditor but will
have to bear the cost by default if the actors don’t?
I have deliberately left out of this the consideration of taxation “avoidance” and
evasion — and other similar “crimes” which could be described as involving unfairness
to society rather than direct theft from it. They form a class of their own where
discussiosn will be determined more by moral attitudes than by contact or existing
auditing lore.
We may be teetering on the brink of , a new bottomless pit called “social
accountability”. The audit now is paid for by the auditee - and is carried out primarily
to protect the auditees’ interests. We may need to consider questions such as: is it fair to
expect the auditee to pay for extension of the writ to protect society at large? Can
society be protected through the process of audit? Would we be looking at inventing a
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crime akin to misprision of felony on the part of any auditor who did not run to the
media or the Government with details of all the horrible discoveries.
It is better that I leave these as questions for discussion at the seminar — if it fires
members’ imaginations. But don’t forget! There is always a cost to be balanced against
any benefits. If the auditor is put under a duty to probe this field of social
accountability, someone must pay — whether it is the auditee, the auditor, or society.
Corning down to basics, I suggest that the public sees the responsibility on the
auditing profession as covering two main areas:
a. revealing, or helping prevent, fraud against the proprietors by members of
firms, companies etc being audited; and
b specific investigations of financial crimes.
It would be convenient to concentrate on those two familiar areas, but I note signs
that perceptions of the field may be widening. There are allegations suggesting
complicity or implication in recent Hong Kong financial collapses. The H. G. Palmer,
ReidMurray, Paciﬁc Acceptance and Cambridge Credit cases have assumed notoriety
in Australia. These may indicate a trend to ﬁx the auditor with liability to creditors and
others external to the audit contract.
I wonder whether this is evidence of deeply held beliefs that there is a duty to that
wider field — or is itan emergence of the American phenomenon of “sue whoever has
the most money or the best insurance!”
The problem becomes one of identification: What does the public expect? What is
the public entitled to? What does the auditing profession believe it is required to give?
(or could give at differing levels of cost).
A paper prepared for the Twelfth International Congress of Accountants held in
1982 (A.F. Batley — Audit Reporting) opened with a quote from Lewis Carroll’s Alice
in Wonderland:
“Then you should say what you mean”, the March Hare went on.
“I do”, Aiice hastily replied, “— at least — at least I mean what I say — that’s the
same thing you know”.
The paper commented that:
Evidence exists to indicate that an expectation gap as to the auditor’s
responsibilities exists between the users of financial statements and auditors as a
consequence of this gap, users attributed meanings to the audit report which went
beyond its scope A unique feature of the evidence of this topic is the consistency
of the findings. In general the expectations of users are found to be greater than
those of the auditor with respect to the scope of his function, his responsibilities
and the meanings attributed to his report. This appears to be a problem
internationally It is suggested that the profession should use the audit report as
an educational tool by clearly delineating the auditor’s responsibilities, the scope
of his audit and the limitations of accounting data.
The paper re-quoted a comment that “The auditors standard report is almost the
only formal means used both to educate and inform users of financial statements
concerning the audit function”, and that the short form audit report (the one which is
endorsed on statements of account) is “a miniscule public manifestation the formation
of which has tended to be motivated by attempts to minimise exposure to liability,
rather than maximise the usefulness of its content
Further, in dealing with “qualified” audit reports, the paper added:
The auditor has in recent times come under severe criticism, as a consequence of
financial scandals, company crashes, fraud and illegal payments. It is sometimes
said that his qualified report enhances ambiguities so as to protect his own self
interest. Whilst the criticism is often unfounded, it is clear that there is a changing
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attitude in society to the auditor is responsibility when things go wrong. (emphasis
added).
Another paper which came my way was the response by the Commonwealth
Department of Finance (dated 28 May, 1985) to the N.C.S.C.‘s consultative paper on
"A True and Fair View”—..w.hether it was:
far more likely that the actual opinion formed by auditors15 that the accounts are
not materially wrong and do not unnecessarily mislead readers. A report which
reﬂected the actual opinion formed by an auditor would, in our opinion, leave
little doubt in the reader’s mind about the nature of the audit report and the audit
function itself.
The nature of the N.C.S.C. consultative paper suggests that body had some
perception of currency of the question whether auditors have been doing thejob which
“England expects ...!”
The debate on the meaning of “true and fair” and the perception of an auditor’s
role was alive and well at least as far back as 1967. Papers from a State Conference of
the Australian Society of Accountants (6-7 October, 1967) on “True and Fair”
recorded the concern of a speaker for the Shareholders’ Association:
If my partner and I appoint a manager of our farm we will want to know the
state of the livestock and the crops the results of the year the prospects for the
future the provisions he has made how the return on the capital we have
invested compares with the return on surrounding properties. We want him
neither to bolster up nor deprecate past results, the present position nor future
prospects! If I am a part owner of a company am I not entitled to the same “true
and fair” appraisal of the company’s affairs?"
”I want to know, and I submit I am entitled to know, the security of my
investment, the efficiency of management and the future prospects both as to
dividends and capital growth’
It is well to recall some parts of Pacific Acceptance where Moffitt J. re-afﬁrmed
the currency of comments in earlier cases and thereby re-afﬁrmed the Court’s
perception of public expectations. The comments immediately following are drawn
from an article by Albert Lacey, LL.B., Ph.D., M.B.S.C., and A. (Peter) Forster,
B.Ec., F.C.A.,- F.C.I.S. in The Australian Accountant (May 1971).
The profession’s plea that if audits were designed to detect fraud it would
necessarily involve large-volume detailed work at prohibitive cost and that, in any
event, good internal systems are more effective, begs the question of audit
responsibility and is liable to be viewed by the courts as bordering on the specious
and as self-serving. The prudent auditor will disregard views or statements which
minimize his responsibility for detecting errors, irregularities and fraud, he will
also pay closer attention to the law. Judicial opinion does not regard the detection
of fraud differently from the detection of irregularities, and it clearly accepts that
both are primary objects of the audit. The auditor is also liable if he ignores his
duty to warn and his duty to report. The fact that such publicity may be adverse to
the interests of management or of the company does not justify or excuse a
breach of duty.
The contention that audit steps and procedure are only taken to enable the
auditor to form his opinion, (on the published accounts) and that there is no
separate duty to audit and to warn (if fraud is discovered) has been rejected:
’This somewhat ingenious approach is not consistent with authority or
common sense and in my view is not soundly based. As has often been
stated, auditors are appointed to safeguard the interests of shareholders and
l. J McKellar White FASA, Public Accountant, Member of Shareholders‘ Association of N.S.W. The
Shareholders View.
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to check on the directors and through them on management ...’ Moffitt J.
citing and approving the dicta of Lindley L]. in re London and General Bank
(No. I) and of Irving C.J. in Morton -v- Arbuckle (No. 2).
The view of the standard seen by the High Court in 1960 (Fullagar J. in
Frankston and Hastings Corporation -v- Cohen) was not that expressed in the
then current edition of Irish on Auditing but was related to Irish 1935, where the
auditor asserted that: The detection of fraud is generally agreed as being of
primary importance.
That decision of Fullagar J., was cited with approval by Mofﬁtt J. His honour also
said “When conduct of an auditor is in question in legal proceedings it is not the
province of the auditing profession itself to determine what is the legal duty of auditors
Whatever else is clear or unclear, it seems certain that, in the long run, the courts
will be the final declarers of the auditing role —— whether it relates to white collar crime
or any other. It may even be that they will arbitrate whether the right words are: true
and fair; or fairly presents; or truly fair; or even “fairly true”.
What is an Audit?
My little Concise Law Dictionary by Osborn calls “auditor” as “originally officers
of the Exchequer; examiners of accounts”. (Is it relevant that the word “account”
covers TALES as well as financial records.) Osborn doesn’t help by describing “audit”
— but I am drawn to the Oxford alternative of “strong ale brewed in some colleges of
Oxford and Cambridge orig. for use on day of audit”.
Clearer to me is that an audit is an independent external examination of matters or
transactions with the object of expressing a skilled opinion or judgment on whether
assertions about those matters or transactions are probably correct. Absolutes can
rarely be achieved. Even truth18 relative. WhatIS true depends on where you stand and
what you believein So the essential advantage of an audit1s that it is an independent,
expert, professional, expression of opinion — and not just the‘‘pufﬁng” of one of the
participants in the play.
When, 45 years ago, I started out on the audit trail, my basic text was Australasian .
Auditing, Albert E. Barton (1923). From p. 30 comes:
To what extent do an auditor’s duties go, and for what is he responsible? In the ﬁrst
place it should be understood that, where an audit is arranged for, in the absence of
any further agreement to the contrary, it is understood that a complete audit is
intended (Smith -v- Sheard 34 Acct. LR. 1906 p65).
An auditor may, in view of the amount of the fee agreed upon, understand in
his own mind that something less than a complete audit will be required of him.
The smallness of the fee would not, of course justify omitting any portion of the
work which would be necessary if he were conducting a complete audit, unless, as
already mentioned, it were clearly arranged between himself and his client that a
partial audit was to be all that was required. In the London Oil Storage Co Ltd -v-
Seear, Hasluck & Co, 1904 Acct. L.R. 31 the Lord Chief Justice in summing up
said ‘you are not to consider for a moment whether Mr Hasluck has been
sufficiently remunerated or not. He has accepted the position and duties of an
auditor and you have not to consider, aye or no, if he has a sufﬁcient amount.’
Where Have We Gone Since 1923?
It’s a sobering thought for an auditor that the concept offraud — as a primary object
of the audit — might now have extended as far as crimes against society and the
environment! Can the object of an audit still be expressed as to “discover errors”
(however caused) and to show the financial position and results as accurately as possible?
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The accountancy profession puts its views in Statement of Auditing Standards
AUS 1 (para 2).
An auditIS the independent examination of an entity. .when such an examination
is conducted with a view to expressing an opinion thereon
That stops a little short of Barton’s objectives — at least I think so. The real
question is what is the public’s perception and expectation? Para. 6 ofAUS 1 amplifies
a bit:
The auditor’s opinion helps establish the credibility of the financial information.
The user, however, should not assume that the auditor’s opinion is an assurance as
to the future viability of the entity nor an opinion as to the efficiency or
effectiveness with which management has conducted the affairs of the entity.
On its face it seems reasonable. But isn’t there a shade of difference between an
objective which seeks to discover errors, so that the financial position may be shown
accurately, and “helping to establish the credibility of ﬁnancial information”? Given
the possible level of sophistication of white collar crime, one must wonder whether the
auditing profession —— like Canute — is just making a public statement that it can ’t
hold back the tide while the public are still under a (mistaken) impression that the
auditors are building sandbanks to protect the public from that tide?
The Accountants’ Miscellaneous Professional Statement APS 2 recommends that
audit engagement letters refer to:
the fact that because of the test nature and other inherent limitations of an audit,
together with the inherent limitations of any system of internal control, there is an
unavoidable risk that even some material mis-statement, fraud or irregularity may
remain undiscovered.
Are the views of the public and the profession, on protection from crime,
co-incident?
Of course it’s a principle of law that ignorance of the law is no excuse — that all
citizens are presumed to know the law (quaere, why, then, do we need lawyers). But is
that principle apt to the engagement of auditors. Has the basic contract between the
auditor and the directors or managers of a company, sufficient notoriety to assume
that the shareholders and creditors and debenture holders are consciously aware of it?
Can the auditors limit their functions, duty, liability, with the consent of the
directors, but unilaterally so far as concerns the expectations of shareholders,
debenture holders, and other investors and creditors? And the public if a concept of
social accountability should be found!
As well as the earlier references to Pacific Acceptance etc there are signs that the
courts in the USA. may find a stricter duty than the profession had propounded. At
the same time that the courts are reasserting a high level of public expectation —
overriding the audit engagement letter or contract —- auditors are coming under cost
pressures. Tendering has obvious attractions to business which sees this as a normal
custom to get goods or services at the cheapest price. But the extent of audit work must
be affected by the fee. It15 common sense that you will only get what you pay for. This
suggests that under a tightly tendered job the auditor will be under some temptation to
cut corners (or to go broke). This seems to me to have another undesirable possibility.
The auditee most in need of a full and searching probe will be the most likely to try any
tactic to lessen the scope for it to happen.
Conclusion
An audit can be effective in finding or helping to prevent larceny, embezzlement
and similar crimes. But different types of white collar crime require different
techniques and raise different moral issues — particularly if the concept of crime
against a wider section of society than the proprietors or shareholders is contemplated.
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The courts show some signs that the wider duty might be found.
In the final analysis it comes down to WHO PAYS? the shareholders etc in the
form of audit fees; creditors, investors and others who lose their funds; the auditors
(and their insurance companies); or society as a whole through the burden of crime!
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
J. O’Donnell
I think if I may, with a little levity, say that I would have liked to have been a
former Editor—General. There is a lot of power in the press, and it might be sometimes
more effective than being an Auditor-General!
The essence of my paper is on page 25, where I said that it is time to consider
whether auditors can, as the public seem to expect, hold back the tide of crime and, if
they can, is it their responsibility? And, in any case, who will pay the cost? It is this
perception that there is a tide of crime and that somehow or other the auditing
profession can protect people against it, that brought the analogy of King Canute to
my mind. Right at the start, you get some argument about whether accountancy, let
alone auditing, is a profession. Certainly, presumably not as old as medicine, although
the clay tablets might pre-date some of the medical techniques. For the last forty five
years I have been specialising in the field of audit. To me the essence of a profession is
forming and expressing an opinion without fear or favour. That requires
independence, and requires a lot of background knowledge, preparedness to analyse
all of the issues and to come out publicly and speak on them. It is not a mechanical
function. It is notjust filling in boxes. It takes carefuljudgment. It carries with it, of
course, responsibility.
As well as that, there is the obligation of conducting a truly independent audit. One
of the problems in maintaining this is the question of perception — whether there is a
difference between the public perception of what they expect and what they get from
the auditors, and the auditor’s perception of what they are obliged to give. Seated in the
middle on this platform, we have a judge, appropriately because it is the judges who
finish up holding that balance between what the public expects and what the auditing
profession believes it is delivering.
The general line of my paper looks first at the title “Crime and the Accountancy
Profession”. There was an earlier reference to people who have been associated with
crime, and I hope Alan Sing will not mind if I say that he has had more association with
crime than we have. But, when you speak of the accounting profession you think in
terms of “White Collar Crime”. Certainly, those who plunge to the bottom of the
harbour should have very white collars — they have had the opportunity to wash them.
But that type of crime is not what I have looked at in my paper.
I think that the public sees the responsibility on the accounting profession, or the
auditing profession, primarily in two areas: the direct area of fraud by members of
firms and companies etc. which are being auditied i.e. fraud against the proprietors of
those firms or undertakings; and, the second area where an auditor is required to
conduct a specific investigation of a known or suspected financial crime.
I wonder whether the field is opening to look at social responsibilities, and I cite as
an example (page 25) the problem of the auditor who on analysing the accounts finds
that the expenditure on waste disposal is much less than the previous year, and starts to
wonder whether the place that he is auditing, instead of adopting proper waste disposal
methods, has been dumping their toxic waste in the Parramatta river. Is there any
obligation on the auditor to follow that through? And again, it all comes down to the
question that if you want to extend an auditor’s obligation into this or less exotic fields
who is going to pay for it? That needs to be sorted out beforehand, because it may be
difficult to expect the firm being audited to pay for its own execution by revelation of
what has happened. Should the auditor pay for it out of the auditing firm’s own
pocket? Is the public going to come along and throw in some extra money for extension
to cover that kind of thing? The paper by Michael Lulan of the Investigation Division
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of Corporate Affairs Commission draws attention specifically to s. 285(10) of the
Companies Act, commenting that there have been very few instances of use of that
section. In brief, as the paper points out, there is an obligation on the auditor who is
satisfied that the code has not been complied with to bring it to the attention of the
Corporate Affairs Commission. That is restricted to the Companies. Code but it now
forms a precedent for this type of revelation. It is possible that that precedent could be
extended into other areas. I will not try to solve it — I am now successfully out of the
active auditing field. But it would suggest that it is one which may become more
prominent as time goes on.
I have looked at some recent revelations or allegations of fraud in relation to some
Hong Kong institutions. We have gone beyond that and there have been several
instances of the courts dealing with other types of irregularities, the Cambridge Credit
case, Paciﬁc Acceptance, Reid Murray, are Australian examples and there are plenty
of overseas examples. It raises the question to me ofjust what is an audit? We find that
the accountancy profession expresses its views in statements of auditing standards,
AUSl, that an audit is “the independent examination of financial information of any
entity”, when such an examination is conducted with a view “to expressing an opinion
thereon”, and further “that the auditor’s opinion helps to establish the credibility ofthe
ﬁnancial information”. But you must not assume that it is an assurance to the efficienty
or effectiveness of the entity or management.
In my view, on its face value, the statement seems reasonable, but I wonder
whether there is a difference between an objective which seeks to discover errors so that
the financial position may be shown accurately, and one which merely (it is my choice
of word “merely”) helps to establish the credibility of financial information. It can be
very interesting going back to the early text books. In the early editions of Irish and
other authors, going back several decades, the emphasis almost always was that the
expressed duty ofthe auditor was to look for fraud. I say “almost”: it stopped short of
making an absolute obligation and, as I see it, the standards have developed away from
that. To me this is where we reach part of the conﬂict which the courts try to adjudicate
upon. On the one hand we have largely unknown public perception, but one which I
think tends towards the feeling that the auditor will protect the public from this kind of
“going-on”. You hear plenty of complaints when a company collapses, “Where were
the auditors?” “Why didn’t they report this earlier?” “Why didn’t they stop it?”. At the
other extreme, the accountancy profession, quite properly I think, states that it is a
contractual situation. Most certainly that is the legal position, a contract between the
auditor and the company or other body who engages the auditor’s services.
Then again you have the comments, and I have quoted some of them particularly
from Pacific Acceptance, from a decision by Fullagar J. It was cited with approval by
Moffit J. referring back to Irish’s earlier text that “The detection of fraud is generally
agreed as being of primary importance”. But Moffit J. also added “When conduct of an
auditor is in question in legal proceedings it is not the province of the auditing
profession itself to determine what is the legal duty of auditors ...”. I must confess to
being still in some uncertainty; on one part we have a fairly clearly expressed
statement, or we have a clearly expressed statement and a fairly clearly reliable
assumption that it is merely a contractual obligation, on the other hand we do have
from time to time instances of the courts saying “No, that is not enough. You can’t
contract out of this duty. It is still there”. There have been American cases which have
tended in the same way saying “It is no good the auditor saying ‘It is not our
responsibility’. The public expects that the auditor will look at these things”. As I
develop my paper, it still comes back to be the important issue; if you frame or change
the obligation of the auditor in relation to crime then who is going to pay for it?
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John Cooke has again raised the spectre of regulation of the accounting
profession. Many people have said that if the profession does not regulate itself then
the government will step in and do it for it. As the Companies Code tightens up (and as
Mr Cooke said two standards became law today) we are heading for rigid control of the
auditor’s duties. Paradoxically that might make the auditor’s task easier because if
there is a set check list that defines the limit of the auditor’s responsibility, and sets the
duties that must be carried out, it may be easier for the auditor just to fillin those
boxes, and say “Well thatis all I am up for”.
But I still maintain that it is aprofessional responsibility, and just to say that the
books are right1n accordance with the law or in accordance with accounting standards.
is not enough. That to me is not exercising professional responsibilityin expressing an
independent opinion.
I most certainly agree with John Cooke and with Ken Rennie that one of the
developing problems is the practice of tendering for audits. I think that severely
restricts the independence of an auditor As I have said on many occasions the entities
which are- most interestedin forcing down the audit fee by going out for tender may
verywell be the entities which should not have a restricted audit, but shouldin fact
have an extended audit. ’ v
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SEARCH WARRANTS AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
Chief Inspector Alan Sing Dip. Crim.
Australian Federal Police
Introduction
On 26 October 1983, the full bench of the High Court consisting of Gibbs C.J.
Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ. handed down a landmark
decision in the case of Baker -v- Campbell, (1983) (49 ALR 385). The question the
court was called upon to decide was whether, in the event that legal professional
privilege attaches to and is maintained in respect of documents held by solicitors on
behalf of their clients, those documents can be properly made the subject of a search
warrant issued under section 10 of the Crimes Act, 1914. The majority, consisting of
Murphy, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ . held that the answer to the question is “No”.
What, it may reasonably be asked, has the decision in Baker -v- Campbell and the
doctrine of legal professional privilege to do with crime and the professions
particularly the accounting profession? The answer is, quite a lot. The most sought
after commodity during major fraud investigations is documentation. Documents
which evidence or purport to evidence the transactions upon which the allegations of
fraud are based, more often than not, are the corner-stone of all prosecutions involving
allegations of fraud. In the vast majority of cases, the most lucrative source of these
documents are accountant’s offices. It is true that solicitors’ ofﬁces also contain many
such documents. Nevertheless, perhaps due to certain financial advantages, most
companies elect to use their accountant’s office as their registered address. Likewise,
company executives have more frequent contact with their accountants than with their
solicitors. Thus, the accountant’s office is more likely to become the major repository
for the documents of his clients.
In recent times a number of special courses have been developed with a view to
teaching police and Corporate Affairs Commission investigators the finer points of
corporate crime investigation. Much emphasis is placed on the analysis of relevant
documents and the application of the relevant law, including the law relating to the
crime of conspiracy. Precious little time is spent on teaching these officers how to
obtain and retain the documents to be analysed. All the analytical skills and all the
legal knowledge in the world are singularly unhelpful unless the relevant documents
can be legally obtained and legally retained. There are a number of means available to
the fraud investigator to obtain documents relevant to his investigation. They include
subpoenas, summonses, notices to produce and search warrants. Without doubt the
most effective means of obtaining documents is by the execution of search warrants.
The law relating to search warrants has received much judicial attention in recent
years. The validity of search warrants has been challenged, often successfully, on a
number of grounds including; lack of specificity in respect of the place to be searched,
the things to be searched for and seized and the offence or offences alleged on the
warrant. Other challenges have been based on jurisdictional and constitutional
questions. For example, does a Justice of the Peace who has been commissioned in
New South Wales have jurisdiction to issue a search warrant under the
Commonwealth Crimes Act for execution in Norfolk Island? Yet other challenges
have been based on the assertion that, notwithstanding the validity of the warrant, the
police officer executing it exceeded the authority conferred by it.
This area of the law has recently been added to and made more difficult by the
decision of the High Court in Baker -v- Campbell. The object of this paper is to explore
the ramifications of the decision and identify the difficulties faced by lawyers,
accountants and police officers during the execution of search warrants when  
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documents, claimed to be protected from disclosure by the doctrine of legal
professional privilege, are involved. Some guidelines to be followed by police officers
during the execution of a search warrant, when a claim of legal professional privilege is
made will be set out. It is hoped that, if acceptable, these guidelines will also be of
assistance to members of the accounting and legal professions.
At the outset it should be said that the right to maintain a claim of legal
professional privilege does not reside in lawyers alone. A claim might prOperly be made
by an accountant on behalf of his client in respect of documents held for the client.
Likewise, a claim may be made by the client himself or anyone holding documents for
the client acting in the interests of the client.
The Effect ofBaker -v- Campbell
The decision in Baker -v- Campbell was remarkable in that it over-ruled the earlier
decision of the High Court in O’Reilly -v- Commissioner of State Bank of Victoria
(1982) 44 ALR 29 and the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Crowley -v-
Murphy (1981) 34 ALR 496 insofar as those decisions were relevant to the protection
afforded to privileged documents during non—judicial proceedings.
Shortly stated, the position prior to Baker —v- Campbell was that legal professional
privilege was a rule of evidence and its operation was confined to judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings. It was not available to protect from search and seizure
documents which came within the terms of a search warrant. There are opposing views
as to the effect of Baker -v- Campbell. Plainly, the decision protects from seizure under
a search warrant documents which are protected from disclosure by the doctrine of
legal professional privilege and in respect of which a claim of privilege is maintained.
There is a difference of opinion as to whether the decision goes further and protects
from inspection, documents in respect of which a claim of privilege is maintained. The
arguments for and against the opposing views involve complex questions of law and
more will be said about this debate later. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say
that the proponents of the view that Baker -v- Campbell extends to protect documents
the subject of a claim of privilege from inspection, contend that the obvious evil of an
inspection would be the destruction of the privilege (assuming it exists), whilst the
proponents of the narrower view (that Baker -v- Campbell applies only to protect
privileged documents from seizure) ask how a dispute arising out of a claim of legal
privilege can be settled in a non-judicial context without inspection?
It should also be understood that an inspection of documents during the execution
of a search warrant does not amount to a seizure. The law recognises that “... a proper
execution of the warrant may and often must involve before seizure a period of
temporary possession for the purposes of examination”(per Holland J. in TrimboIi -v-
Onley (No. 3) (1981) 56 FLR 321 at 335). The desirability of resolving disputes arising
out of a claim of legal professional privilege without judicial intervention is clear. The
High Court said as much in Baker -v- Campbell (see for example, the comments of
Dawson J. 49 ALR 385 at 446).
It should be emphasised that the guidelines set out below are meant to be ﬂexible.
They can and should be modified to suit the requirements of the parties to the dispute.
It should be appreciated, however, that any substituted procedure which would
involve removal of the disputed documents without an on-site inspection, would,
prima facie, involve an illegal seizure should the claim prove to be well founded. Before
proceeding to set down the guidelines it is important to explain the nature and the
scope of legal professional privilege. It is also important to understand that the
privilege is the client’s privilege and can only be waived by the client.
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Client’s Privilege
It is clear that the privilege does not reside in the accountant or solicitor
maintaining the claim. It is in fact the client’s privilege and can only be waived by the
client. The accountant or solicitor has no right to waive the client’s privilege without
instructions. Moreover, the claim may be maintained by the client in respect of
documents in his hands which the client believes to be privileged. Likewise, the
privilege may be claimed by a third party holding documents on behalf of the client.
The point to grasp is that the right to maintain a claim of legal professional privilege is
not restricted to legal practitioners. A claim may be, and frequently is, made by an
accountant acting in the interests of his client.
The Scope of the Privilege
The first essential thing to understand is that the scope of the privilege is very
narrow. Legal professional privilege attaches only to:
(a) Communications for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice; and
(b) Documents brought into existence for the sole purpose of anticipated or
current litigation.
In Baker -v- Campbell Dawson J. at p. 439 characterised the scope of the privilege
this way:
Legal professional privilege attaches only to communications made for the
purpose of giving or receiving advice or for use in existing or anticipated litigation.
Moreover, if the communication in question is in the form of a document
submitted by a client to his solicitor for use in existing or anticipated litigation,
privilege will attach to it only if it comes into existence solely for that purpose. The
privilege cannot operate to put beyond the reach of the law documentary or other
material which has an existence apart from the process of giving or receiving
advice or the conduct of litigation. See Grant -v- Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674.
There is no privilege for physical objects other than documents and there is no
privilege for documents which are the means of carrying out, or are evidence of,
transactions which are not themselves the giving or receiving of advice or part of
the conduct of actual or anticipated litigation.
Communications which would otherwise be privileged lose their immunity
from disclosure if they amount to participation in a crime or a fraud. The compass
within which the doctrine of legal professional privilege operates is, therefore,
narrow having regard to the princple which it protects (emphasis added).
The second essential thing to notice about the decision in Baker -v- Campbell is
that the question posed for resolution was:
In the event that legal professional privilege attaches to and is maintained in
respect of the documents held by the firm can those documents be properly made
the subject of a search warrant issued under section 10 of the Crimes Act?
Consequently, on a strict reading of the case, Baker -v- Campbell principles do not
apply until a claim of privilege is maintained. As a matter of interest the question, as set
out above, is taken from the headnote of the report of the case in (1983) 57 AL]R 749
and is consistent with the wording appearing in the original judgment. In the headnote
of the ALR report of Baker -v- Campbell the words “and is maintained”do not appear.
They do appear in the body of the report. The onus for maintaining a claim rests with
the person who asserts the existence of the privilege. There is no onus on the police
officer executing the warrant to alert the accountant or solicitor to the existence of a
possible claim of privilege. There is, of course, an onus on the police officer to act
reasonably and with propriety during the execution of a search warrant. More will be
said about this onus later.
To summarise the scope of legal privilege insofar as the doctrine has operation in
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respect of the execution of search warrants, it applies only to documents. The
documents which come within the scope of the privilege must fit the criteria set out
above. No other documents can properly be the subject ofa claim. On the other hand,
not all documents which fit the criteria will be protected by a claim of privilege. As
Murphy J. points out in Baker -v- Campbell the claim of privilege is not available if a
client seeks legal advice in order to facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud and it
matters not whether the adviser knows of the unlawful purpose or not (49 ALR 385 at
409).
The Nature of the Privilege
Legal professional privilege operates to protect from compulsory disclosure
certain communications between a practitioner and his client. Prior to the decision in
Baker -v- Campbell the operation of the doctrine was restricted to proceedings of a
judicial or quasi-judicial nature. It was regarded as a rule of evidence. It precluded the
making of a judicial order compelling the production of a privileged document in the
hands of the practitioner or his client. The operation of the doctrine was, and still is,
restricted to privileged communications only while they remain in the hands of the
practitioner, the client or a third party holding them for the client. The doctrine does
not determine the admissibility of privileged documents. If the document falls into the
hands of the opposing party, the tender of it in legal proceedings will not necessarily be
rejected on the ground that it is privileged.
As Ormrod L.J. said in Tompkins (1979) 67 Cr. App. R. 181 at 184:
Privilege relates only to production of a document; it does not determine its
admissibility in evidence. The note, though clearly privileged from production was
admissible in evidence once it was in possession of the prosecution.
Judicial Discretion
Notwithstanding the fact that a privileged document (or a copy of it) is, providing
it is relevant, admissible if tendered by the opposing party, it may ultimately be
excluded in the exercise ofjudicial discretion. Consequently, even if a police ofﬁcer, in
the bona fide belief that a document was not subject to legal professional privilege,
seized it under the purported authority of a search warrant, it does not necessarily
follow that the document would be admitted in evidence if tendered by the
prosecution. The operation ofjudicial discretion in this context was explained in the
dissentingjudgment of Brennan J. in Baker -v- Campbell (1983) 49 ALR 385 at 428:
A court is bound, especially in its criminal jurisdiction, to reject evidence if its
admission would damage the public interest. It would be damaging to the public
interest to admit in evidence a document that has been brought into existence
solely for use in litigation that is pending, intended or reasonably apprehended, or
a copy of such a document unless the consent of the person entitled to the privilege
is given to the tender. The tender ofsuch a document in evidence shouldbe rejected
not so much because it affects the interests of the persons entitled to the privilege,
but because it subverts the court’s procedure for conducting adversary litigation
(emphasis added).
Since the decision in Baker -v— Campbell, the protection against compulsory
disclosure of the contents of privileged documents afforded by the doctrine of legal
professional privilege is no longer confined to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
For present purposes it is sufficient to appreciate that it now operates to protect
privileged documents from seizure under a search warrant. Moreoever, on one view of
the effect of the decision, it protects from inspection during the execution of a search
warrant, documents the subject of a claim of legal privilege.
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The Police Officer’s Dilemma
One of the difficulties with Baker -v- Campbell is that no attempt was made by the
Justices who formed the majority to lay down any formula to be followed by police
officers when faced with a claim of legal privilege during the execution of a search
warrant. It is clear that the justices were of the view that disputes arising out of a claim
of legal privilege should, if practicable, be resolved in a non-judicial context. The
dilemma facing the hapless police officer confronted with a claim oflegal privilege is a
difficult one. If he makes an inspection of the document over the objection of the
person maintaining the claim and it transpires that the claim is well founded, the
confidential nature of the document, the very thing the privilege seeks to preserve, is
lost. Moreover, on one view of the effect of Baker -v- Campbell, a police officer who
inspects a document, the subject of a claim oflegal privilege, does so at his peril and is
liable for an action in trespass if the claim proves to be well founded.
If the document is not privileged then it is difficult to see how an action for trespass
could succeed provided, of course, the authority to search conferred by the warrant
had not been exceeded. It is submitted that this situation is completely untenable.
Suppose the police officer acted in good faith. Is the lawfulness of the inspection to be
determined only after a judicial determination of the nature of the document
inspected?
Plainly, if after inspection, the police officer agreed with the validity of the claim
and proceeded to seize the document anyway, his conduct would be reprehensible and
an action trespass, detinue and, probably, conversion, would likely succeed. On the
other hand if the police officer returned the document to the solicitor in acknowledge-
ment of the validity of the claim, could he be said to have acted mala ﬁde? It is
submitted that the actions of a police officer who inspects, over objection, during the
execution of a search warrant, a document which is claimed to be protected by legal
privilege, will be judged according to established principles, including, inter alia,
whether he acted reasonably and in good faith.
An attractive alternative to making an inspection of a document, the subject of a
claim of legal privilege would be to simply accept the word of the person maintaining
the claim. There are at least four objections to this course. They are:
l. The person may be wrong even though he believes he is right.
2. He may be deliberately lying.
3. He may be acting in the belief that he is duty bound to protect a particularly
damaging document whether it is privileged or not.
4. Even if the document is privileged, it may yet be subject to seizure if it was
utilised to facilitate the commission of an offence described on the warrant.
It is submitted that if the view of Baker -v- Campbell which asserts that it is
unlawful for a police officer, during the lawful execution of a claim of legal privilege,
for the purpose of forming his own view as to the merits of the claim, represents the
law, then the law should be changed.
The execution of a search warrant should not involve procedures comparable with
betting on the outcome of a horse race. If inspection ofdocuments is lawful in order to
determine whether they are liable to seizure, then the law should be consistent. If it is
lawful to inspect a bank voucher to determine whether it is covered by the warrant,
then it ought to be lawful, in appropriate cases, to sufficiently inspect a document, the
subject of a claim ofprivilege, in order to make the same determination.
The object of this dissertation of the dilemmas associated with the inspection of
documents, the subject of a claim of legal privilege, is to demonstrate that there is no
easy answer to the problems created for police officers, lawyers and accountants by
Baker -v- Campbell. If a decision is taken to inspect, the inspection may later be
deemed unlawful. If a decision is taken to accept the word of the person maintaining
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the claim of legal privilege, valuable evidence might be lost. Ultimately, the decision
has to fall to the police officer authorised to execute the warrant. A consideration of
some of the possible consequences should be helpful.
First of all, unless the person asserting the existence of the privilege takes the
further step of initiating legal proceedings for the purpose of enforcing his claim, there
are no civil consequences for the police officer at all. Thus, even if a police officer were
to seize documents the subject of a claim of privilege in the belief that the claim was
valid, he would suffer no civil consequences unless relief was sought. He might, of
course, suffer some other consequences. A complaint might be made resulting in a
disciplinary investigation. In any event, the deliberate seizure of documents or things
not within the ambit of the warrant is unlawful and cannot be condoned.
Second, suppose an inspection of documents, the subject of a claim of legal
privilege is made over the objection of the person maintaining the claim and, after
inspection, the police officer agrees with the validity of the claim and returns the
documents. On one view of Baker -v- Campbell he has committed an actionable wrong
by making the inspection. On another view he has committed no actionable wrong at
all. Is it likely that many persons would regard the police officer’s actions so seriously
they would be prepared to test the lawfulness of his actions by instituting proceedings
for trespass? Even if such an action was taken against the police officer and it
succeeded, would a court be likely to award more than nominal damages against the
police ofﬁcer?
Itis submitted that a reasoned consideration of the points canvassed above might
lead to the conclusion that the correct balance between the competing public interests
of law enforcement and the protection of individual rights might, in appropriate cases,
require an on--site inspection of documents, the subject of a claim of legal privilege,
over the objection of the person maintaining the claim. Consequently, the guidelines
set out below will be based on the assumption that this conclusion15, in appropriate
cases, justiﬁed.
When is a Document, the Subject of a Claim of Legal Privilege, Privileged in fact?
A fundamental question which appears to have escaped attention in the debate
which has been generated by the decision in Baker -v- Campbell and which, it is
submitted, is crucial to the outcome of any proceedings arising from a dispute is —
When is a document, the subject of a claim of legal privilege, privileged in fact? The
simple answer is, of course, that a privileged document is a privileged document from
the moment it comes into existence. The complicating factor is that nobody can know
with absolute certainty that a document is, in fact, privileged until a judicial
determination has been made that legal privilege attaches to the document.
The fact that a claim of legal privilege is maintained prior to such a determination
may, for all practical purposes, be of little consequence for the purpose of protecting
the document from search and seizure. It has been pointed out above that the decision
in Baker -v- Campbell clearly protects from seizure under the authority of a search
warrant, documents to which legal professional privilege attaches. The position in
respect of documents to which legal privilege may attach is by no means cut and dried.
Whilst the point may be technical it is clearly possible to distinguish between
documents to which legal professional privilege attaches and documents claimed to be
protected by legal privilege. If the doctrine of legal professional privilege remained
remained confined to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings there would be no
difficulty. A claim of legal professional privilege could bejudicially determined by the
tribunal conducting the proceedings. By extending the operation of the doctrine
outside the court-room, the decision in Baker -v- Campbellseems to have created more
problems than it has solved. Unless legal proceedings are on foot or are instituted,
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there is no competent tribunal legally capable of determining the claim.
On a strict construction of Baker —v— Campbell, the protection from seizure and,
perhaps, inspection, only applies to documents which are infact privileged. This view
of the law would assert that a mere claim of legal privilege is not sufﬁcient to render
unlawful in inspection of documents the subject of the claim. It is not here being
suggested that an inspection will be appropriate in every case. There Will no doubt be
many cases where an inspection, whilst not unlawful, is not justified.
In the majority of cases, the very nature of documents, the subject of a claim of
legal privilege, will enable an accurate determination of the claim to be made in a
non-judicial context provided, of course, the parties to the dispute act reasonably and
the person maintaining the claim is prepared to provide sufficient information about
the character of the document. Moreover, it is not difficult to envisage that many
disputes could be resolved without the police officer executing the warrant finding it
necessary to resort to an inspection. In other cases, a partial inspection may satisfy the
police officer without the need to disclose the confidential contents of the documents.
Consequently, it should only be in those cases where the police officer is not able to
ascertain sufficient information about the character of the disputed documents to
enable him to accept the validity of the claim, that he will need to resort to an
inspection.
The guidelines which are set out below have been framed with a view towards
balancing the competing public interests that criminal offences should be detected an
punished and, at the same time, the right of the individual to the protection of the law
from unjustified interference with his property should be upheld.
The Guidelines
At the outset it should be said that “The overriding obligation of the searcher is to
do no more than is reasonably necessary to satisfy himself by search that in all the
circumstances of a particular case he has whatever documents are necessary to answer
the terms of the warrant” (per Lockhart J. in Crowley -v- Murphy (1981) 34 ALR 496
at 525). It is submitted that, in the present context the words “search” and “inspect”
may be regarded as having a similar meaning. What is “reasonably necessary” will
clearly vary from case to case. Some useful advice is to be gleaned from the judgments
delivered in Crowley -v- Murphy, particularly the judgment of Lockhart J. from 526
onwards. His Honour pointed to the case of a solicitor carrying on a small practice
with relatively few clients, one of whom accounts for most of the solicitor’s work. He
was of the view that in such a case, a police officer executing a search warrant in respect
of documents held on behalf of that client might be justiﬁed in searching all the files
held for the client.
He also gave as an example the case of a disorganised office with no readily
discernible filing system which might reasonably indicate the location of the files
sought. Again, he thought a negative search might be justified. He contrasted these
examples with the case of a well established and reputable firm holding ﬁles for many
clients. He considered that it would be quite improper to conduct a negative search in
such a case if it was clear that the files of only one or two clients came within the terms
of the warrant, particularly if there was no suggestion that the solicitors themselves
were implicated. He pointed to the potential for abuse if negative searches were
authorised in such circumstances. In order to locate the ﬁles and documents which
might anser the warrant Lockhart J. considered the searching officers should ﬁrst of all
look to documents and indexes used to control the administration of the office. If
reasonably practicable, the search should be confined to the areas indicated by the
index systems.
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Assume then that a police officer has, in all respects, observed the standards of
propriety required and is confronted by a claim of legal professional privilege in
respect of a document he would otherwise be entitled to look at in accordance with the
principles set out above. What course should the police officer adopt? First of all an
attempt should be made to reach a consensus with the person maintaining the claim as
to the type of documents which may properly be the subject of a claim‘of legal privilege.
That is:
(a) Communications for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice; and
(b) Documents brought into existence for the sole purpose of anticipated or
current litigation.
Unless the person maintaining the claim is prepared to assert that the disputed
doucments fall within the recognised criteria he should be advised that he is not entitled
to withhold them from inspection on the ground that they are protected by legal
professional privilege. If the person does assert that the documents come within the
criteria he should be asked whether they come within criteria (a) or criteria (b). If he
asserts that they fall within criteria (a) he should be asked if the legal advice was sought
or provided prior to the commission of the offence / s alleged on the face of the warrant.
If he maintains the documents came into existence after the relevant date he should be
requested to show the police officer that part of the document which would
substantiate the assertion. The remainder of the document could be covered from view.
It is difficult to conceive of circumstances where memoranda of legal advice brought
into existence after the commission of the offence/ 5 described on the warrant could
lose the immunity afforded by the doctrine of legal professional privilege.
Should it be established that a document claimed to be within criteria (a) came into
existence prior to the commission of the offence alleged on the warrant, it is possible
that even if prima facie privileged, it may have been obtained in order to facilitate the
commission of the offence, in which case it would be subject to seizure under the
warrant. The person maintaining the claim should be questioned with a view to
establishing whether this might be the case. The person should also be asked for the
name of the client in whom he asserts the privilege resides.
If the person asserts that the disputed document comes within criteria (b) he
should be questioned with a view to establishing whether the documents have been
brought into existence solely for the purpose of litigation. If they are documents which
constitute or evidence transactions (such as contracts, conveyances, declarations of
trust, offers or receipts) they cannot be the subject of a claim of legal privilege even if
they have come into the hands of the solicitor or counsel for advice or for use in
litigation (per Murphy J. in Baker -v- Campbell (1983) 49 ALR 385 at 409).
Having followed this procedure and having given due consideration to all the
circumstances, including the possibility of the person maintaining the claim being
implicated in the offence, a decision must be made whether an inspection of the
document is to be made for the purpose of the police officer forming a view as to the
validity of the claim. If a decision is made to make an inspection and the person
maintaining the claim is not prepared to release the original document, he should be
asked if he is prepared to make a photocopy in the presence of the police officer and
place it in a sealed envelope. If the person agrees to this procedure he should be given a
written undertaking that the copy will be retained in a sealed condition for seventy two
hours, or a longer period if a week-end or public holiday is involved. The person should
be informed that unless he takes appropriate legal action to enforce the claim within
the stipulated period the envelope will be opened and the document will be examined.
It should be explained to the person that if he agrees to this course the copy will be
removed from the premises on the basis that it is being provided to the police officer
voluntarily and is not being seized under the authority of the warrant. This fact should
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be recorded in writing and signed by both the person and the police officer. Should the
person take action within the stipulated period then the envelope containing the copy
should be delivered unopened to the registrar of the Court out of which the relevant
process was issued.
In the event that the person will not agree to the provision of a photocopy of the
document in a sealed envelope on the terms and conditions set out above, he should be
advised that the police officer will go ahead and make an examination of the original
document for the purpose of forming a view as to the merits of the claim of legal
privilege. The person should also be advised that the document will not be seized if the
police officer agrees with the validity of the claim following the inspection. Should the
person remain unco—operative the consequences of obstructing a police officer in the
execution of his duty should be explained. If the person persists with the same attitude,
whatever steps are reasonable should then be taken to ensure that the warrant is duly
executed. If the use of force is required, then no more force than is necessary to
properly execute the warrant may be used.
The police officer should keep in mind that it is his responsibility to control the
situation at all times. Whilst all reasonable steps must be taken, it should always be the -
police officer responsible for the execution of the warrant who decides on what
procedures are reasonable. Before taking a difficult decision the police officer
concerned might be well advised to consult with an experienced senior police officer or
an experienced legal adviser. In fact, in cases where it may be predicted that difficulties
may arise it is good practice to have an experienced legal adviser on standby.
Under no circumstances should the police officer allow the person maintaining the
claim of privilege to dictate terms. At the same time, the person should be allowed a
reasonable opportunity to seek instructions from his client and, if he wishes to do so, to
seek legal advice. Unreasonable delays should not be consented to. What may
constitute an unreasonable delay will depend on the circumstances of the particular
case. It will fall to the judgment of the police officer executing the warrant to decide
what is reasonable in this context.
On occasions it will be necessary to execute search warrants on vacant premises.
Similarly, there will be occasions when documents are discovered which might attract
a claim of privilege if a lawyer representing the client was present. This might occur, for
example, during the execution of a search warrant on an accounting firm or a
warehouse being used as a document repository. Whilst there is no onus on the police
officer executing the warrant to alert the person who might be entitled to maintain a
claim, propriety requires that a property list should be prepared recording the descrip-
tion of all documents seized, including any documents potentially the subject of a claim
of legal privilege. The list should be forwarded to the person or persons who have a
proprietary interest in the documents in order that a claim of legal privilege can be
maintained if considered appropriate.
In those cases where the person maintaining the claim consents to the voluntary
provision of a sealed photocopy of the disputed document on the terms and conditions
set out above and does not take any action to enforce the claim within the stipulated
period, the seal should be broken and the document examined. Should a provisional
determination be made that the document is in fact privileged, legal advice should be
sought with a view to ascertaining whether the document may be useful in subsequent
proceedings. If it should eventuate, after inspection, that the original of the document
would not be within the terms of the warrant or the copy is, in any case, of no further
interest to the prosecution, it should be immediately returned whether it is considered
to be privileged or not.
If, following an inspection of the sealed document, it is determined that the
document is not privileged or, if privileged, was used to facilitate the commission of an
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offence, a supplementary information should be prepared and a fresh warrant or
warrants sought with a View to seizing the original document. If it transpires that the
original has been removed or for some other reason it cannot be obtained, then a
suitable notice to produce and/or a subpoena to produce documents should be
prepared and served. The purpose of taking these steps will be to lay the foundation for
the tender of the photocopy of the original document as secondary evidence.
In those cases where a decision is taken to inspect the original document and,
following inspection, the police officer agrees with the validity of the claim, the
document should be returned immediately. If the police office is of the view that the
document is not protected by legal privilege, it should be seized. If it is patently clear
that the documents could, under no circumstances, be privileged, and the description
of the document provided by the person prior to inspection is inconsistent with the
document inspected, consideration should be given to charging the person with
obstructing, or attempting to obstruct, a police officer in the execution of his duty.
General Guidelines for the Execution of Search Warrants — Legal and Accounting
Ofﬁces
From an analysis of the cases it is suggested that the following guidelines can be
extracted in relation to the execution of search warrants on legal and accounting
offices. The same guidelines would apply to a large extent to business houses, banks
and other institutions carrying files for a large number of clients and searches of
premises occupied by innocent third parties.
A. The first pre-requisite is that both the information and warrant must be properly
drawn. It is essential that all requirements going to jurisdiction, form, reasonable
cause, sufficient particularity with regard to the place to be searched, the things to
be seized and the offence or offences alleged etc. be strictly complied with. Failure
to comply with these requirements will result in the warrant being quashed in the
event of a challenge. Accordingly, a police officer intending to obtain a search
warrant should first seek legal advice through the usual channels unless the
exigencies of the investigation preclude such a course. In complex cases it will
often be advantageous to seek this advice before drafting the information and
warrant. In any event, copies of the draft information and warrant should be
provided to an experienced legal officer for checking prior to the information
being presented to a Justice. Whilst many search warrant provisions confer
jurisdiction to issue a search warrant on Justices of the Peace, search warrants
should only be sought from a legally qualified Justice unless, because of emergent
circumstances or the remoteness of the location, it is not practicable to do so.
B. It should be assumed that, as an innocent third party, the accountant or solicitor is
entitled to an explanation of the purpose of the search and an invitation to
co-operate. On entry, the senior officer should introduce himself and other
members of the search team and produce identification. Depending on the
circumstances a search team of three or four persons will generally be sufficient for
most situations.
C. Following introductions the accountant or solicitor concerned should be invited
to participate in a private discussion with the senior officer and his immediate
assistant. The other members of the team might be requested to remain in the
waiting area until this discussion is completed.
D. During the discussion the purpose of the visit should be explained to the
accountant or solicitor. A copy of the search warrant should be provided to the
accountant or solicitor. In any event, he has a right to the production of the
warrant on demand.
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Following an explanation of the purpose of the visit and the production of the
warrant, an invitation should be extended to the accountant or solicitor to
co-operate by indicating the location of the documents or other things sought. ~
Politeness and tact are the key words. It should be explained politely but ﬁrmly,
that whilst the accountant or solicitor is not himself under suspicion, certain
documents and / or other things believed to be on the premises are being sought
and, whilst the warrant authorises a search for those things, it is not intended that
any more disturbance than necessary should be caused to his office.
Generally it may be anticipated that the accountant or solicitor will want to
communicate with the client concerned to inform him of the position. He may also
want to seek legal advice from counsel. In the interests of providing sufficient
opportunity to the accountant or solicitor to co-operate, a reasonable time should
be allowed for him to take this action prior to the warrant being executed. Care
should be taken, however, to ensure that no unreasonable delay results from those
measures.
Should the accountant or solicitor decide to co-operate he should be invited to
indicate to the search team the location of the documents being sought. A request
should also be made to view the office index systems in order to establish that all
relevant documents have been located. It should be borne in mind that the
accountant or solicitor may be withholding certain documents in the belief
(whether justified or not) that they are protected by legal professional privilege.
In the event of co-operation being refused, the accountant or solicitor should be
politely but firmly advised that the search will proceed and, because the search
team is not familiar with his office systems this may entail a search of all files and
documents in his office in order to give full effect to the authority conferred by the
warrant. Care must be taken to ensure that this explanation cannot be construed
as a threat to “ransack” the office if co-operation is refused. In this connection it
should be explained that the search team will do it’s best to confine the search as
much as is reasonably possible subject to assessment of any office indices which
enable this to be done.
The search team should then execute the search warrant.
The first step should be a preliminary search to locate indices and other informat-
ion which it is reasonable to believe will indicate the location of the documents
sought.
Depending on the size of the premises, at least one member should be given the
sole task of observing staff to ensure no attempt is made to remove or destroy
documents which may afford evidence. It may also be appropriate, with the
concurrence of the principals of the firm to call the staff together and address them
so they will be aware of what is taking place.
If suitable indices are located which indicate the location of the documents being
sought, the search should not extend beyond the defined areas unless there is
sufficient reason for doing so.
. Once having committed the team to a search without the co-operation of the
accountant or solicitor, do not allow him to interfere. If any person present
continues to interfere after being asked not to, the consequences of obstructing
police officers in the execution of their duty should be politely but firmly
explained.
When, and only when, the warrant holder is satisifed that all relevant material has
been located and seized, should the search be terminated. Every effort should be
made to leave the office in the same condition it was in prior to the search.
Anything disturbed to facilitate the search should be returned if possible, to its
original position and condition.
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. As is the case with any search, the appointed property office or officers should
observe everything seized and keep a suitable running record of the place of seizure
. etc. Only documents covered by the warrant may be seized. Inspection of
documents for the purpose of determining whether they are within the ambit of the
warrant must take place on—site. A search warrant does not authorize the removal
of documents in bulk in order that they may later be culled at the convenience of
the warrant holder with a view to returning unwanted documents. (See the
comments of Holland J. in Trimboli -v- Onley (No. 3) (1981) 56 FLR 321 at 337).
The property officer should then make a detailed list ofﬁles etc seized and provide
a receipt to the accountant or solicitor prior to leaving the premises. If the
documents seized are bulky, the accountant or solicitor might be encouraged to go
through them, recording them as he does so with the aid of a dictaphone or tape
recorder.
. Following advice, any documents not required for the purposes of the inquiry
should be returned as soon as possible. If practicable, copies of all seized
documents should be made available to the accountant or solicitor as soon as
possible. Obviously this procedure will be dependant on the bulk of the documents
seized. In any event, reasonable access should be allowed to the accountant,
solicitor or client to facilitate inspection of the seized documents.
. Should the accountant or solicitor maintain a claim of legal professional privilege
in respect of any documents held on behalf of a client the guidelines set out onpage
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If advised that an ex parte restraining order is to be sought by the accountant or
solicitor maintaining the claim, he should be informed that the Director of Public
Prosecutions is your legal representative and that a legal officer attached to his
office has been instructed to represent you at any application which might be made
to a judge for a restraining order. The accountant or solicitor should then be
requested to provide the name and the location of the judge from whom the
restraining order is to be sought. If this information is provided it should be
immediately telephoned through to the relevant D.P.P. ofﬁce. In the event that the
accountant or solicitor fails to provide this information he should be informed
that you intend to prepare an afﬁdavit setting out the fact that the information was
sought and refused. '
Should the accountant or solicitor be successful in obtaining a restraining
order the search must be stopped. Failure to comply with such an order amounts
to contempt of court. Should the existence of the order be conveyed by telephone
the caller should be asked to identify himself and to provide you with a telephone
number on which you can call him back. The caller should be asked for details of
the name and location of thejudge who granted the order, the contents ofthe order
and when it was granted. The judge’s associate or the judge himself should be
contacted with a view to confirming the existence of the order. If the terms of the
order have not been settled and reduced to writing you should inform the judge or
his associate that your legal representative is standing by and wishes to be heard
before the terms of the order are settled. Finally, you should seek a direction from
the judge as to the custody of the documents already seized. A direction should
also be sought with a view to preserving documents or things which, whilst not
seized, have been identified during the search, as being potentially seizable under
the warrant should the warrant ultimately survive the challenge. Generally, the
court over which the judge presides would be the most appropriate repository
pending the outcome of litigation.
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Conclusion - ‘
The guidelines contained in this paper should be regarded as being addition to, and
not in derogation of, any existing police rules and instructions which. prescribe
procedures for the obtaining and execution of search warrants.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
ChiefInspectorAlan Sing
When I submitted my paper for this seminar I was asked if I could point to any
authority for the view that an accountant could maintain a claim of legal professional
privilege in respect of documents held for a client during the execution of a search
warrant on the accountant’s office. I had to confess that I was not aware of any such
authority. Nevertheless I think I am right in saying that an accountant or a police
officer or, indeed, anybody acting in the interests of the person in whom the privilege
resides can maintain a claim of legal professional privilege providing that claim is made
outside the court-room. Once the dispute goes to court then the right to maintain a
claim would be restricted to the client and his lawyer.
There are, of course, certain conditions precedent which must be satisfied before a
claim of legal professional privilege may be made. First, the lawyer/ client relationship
must be established. It is-sufﬁcient if the client at the relevant time had manifested the
intention to consult a lawyer. Second, the documents the subject of the claim must be
communications for the purpose of giving' or receiving legal advice or documents
brought into existence for the sole purpose of being submitted to a lawyer for use in
anticipated or current litigation. No other documents can properly by the subject of
legal professional privilege.
Whether or not a claim of legal professional privilege made during the execution of
a search warrant is effective to protect from search and seizure, the documents the
subject of the claim is another question and in this context, I doubt that it matters
whether the person making the claim is a lawyer or not. The only distinction between
the obligations of a lawyer and an accountant or anyone else who makes a claim of
legal professional privilege on behalf of a client in a non-judicial context is that the
lawyer is bound to make a claim and cannot withdraw the claim without his client’s
instructions. »
In any case, the legal implications of such a claim outside the court-room are at
least dubious and at most arguable. On a strict reading of Baker -v- Campbell, the case
reviwed in my paper, the extended operation of the doctrine of legal professional
privilege approved by the High Court applies only to documents to which legal
professional privilege, attaches conclusively. A mere claim of privilege is not
conclusive of the existence of the privilege, a difﬁculty which was identiﬁed by Justice
Mason in Baker -v- Campbell. Nor, indeed, is a purported determination of a claim of
privilege conclusive if made outside the court-room.
Because of these difficulties inherent in the operation of the doctrine of legal
professional privilege outside the court-room, it is important that lawyers, accountants
and police officers should endeavour to reach a general concensus on a procedure
which will serve to resolve disputes arising out of a claim of legal professional privilege
during the execution of a search warrant without the need for judicial intervention.
Another question I have been asked relates to legal advice provided by unqualiﬁed
persons. Can a claim of legal professional privilege be made in or out of court in respect
of legal advice provided by accountants or police prosecutors who are not qualiﬁed? I
am sure there are many persons here who are better qualified than I to answer that
question. Nevertheless, at the risk of getting in over my head my opinion is that a claim
of legal professional privilege is not available to protect from disclosure,
communications between a client and an unqualified adviser. This view, insofar as it
relates to accountants, was recently upheld in Western Australia in Barristers Boardof
Western Australia -v- Central Tax Services.
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At the same time, there would seem to be no reason why an accountant, acting in
the interests of his client, could not maintain, during the execution of a search warrant,
a claim of legal professional privilege in respect of a legal opinion prepared for his
client by counsel and retained in the accountant’s ofﬁce. Likewise, there would seem to
be no reason why a police officer could not maintain a claim of legal professional
privilege, in or out of Court, in respect ofdocuments brought into existence for the sole
purpose of litigation, such as statements obtained from witneSses, provided the police
officer had manifested the intention to submit the documents to his legal adviser. This
proposition was upheld recently by Justice Lusher of the New South Wales Supreme
court in Roberts -v- Glass, a case arising out of the so-called “bikie” murders.
In Baker -v- Campbell, Justice Murphy went so far as to suggest that the
protection from disclosure afforded by the doctrine of legal professional privilege
should be available to persons preparing for litigation even in the absence of a
client/lawyer relationship. As a matter of logic this view cannot be faulted, since to
argue otherwise would be to assert that documents brought into existence by litigants
in person can only attract the protection of legal professional privilege if a lawyer is.
consulted. Some litigants, for financial reasons or otherwise, do not engage lawyers to
conduct their litigation. For example, criminal proceedings brought by police ofﬁcers
are conducted, very successfully, by unqualiﬁed police prosecutors every day. Justice
Murphy went on to say that he considered there is some force in the argument that legal
advice should not be elevated above other professional advice such as medical or
financial advice. Again, the logic of this view is difficult to fault.
Finally, my paper is not and is not intended to be an exposition of the law relating
to legal professional privilege. Rather, it is an attempt to lay down some guidelines to
be followed by police officers, lawyers and accountants with a view to resolving
disputes arising out of claims of legal professional privilege during the execution of
search warrants. I should point out that the views expressed are my own and do not
necessarily reﬂect the views of the Australian Federal Police. I would be happy to listen
to any contrary views.
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CAMBRIDGE CREDIT — THE STRAW THAT COULD BREAK THE
CAMEL’S BACK
R. J. Rennie, F. CA
Chartered Accountant
Deputy Chairman ofNSW State Council of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants1n Australia
In the last 10 years or so the accounting profession has done itself a grave
disservice. Hiding behind the assurance of large professional indemnity insurance
covers, the major accounting firms have in most cases chosen to settle out of court,
actions brought against them because of losses incurred by corporate clients. In many
cases those losses have been occasioned by fraud perpetrated by directors and / or
senior executives of companies.
' The historyin the United States of America has been particularly bad, where
accounting firms have chosen to settle claims within the limits of their professional
indemnity cover rather than fight protracted battles in court and incur the brunt of the
unfavourable publicity which would ensure in those circumstances. The insurance
underwriters have no doubt, in some cases, contributed to the pressure to settle cases,
in order to contain both settlement figures and legal costs, but I believe that the firms’
primary concern of containing adverse publicity has often been the overriding factorin
deciding to settle out of Court.
Three factors have now arisen, however, which have jolted the accounting
profession out of its complacency. Firstly the practice of companies calling for tenders
for their audits has led to enormous pressure being brought to bear on audit fees. The
United States has been the front runner in the development of the tendering process
but its inﬂuence has now spread to Europe and other parts of the world, particularly
Australia. The stories of accounting firms tendering low for audit assignments,
particularly in the USA, are endless. I can only hope that the situation which
purportedly occurred in Italy in 1984 will not be often repeated. In this case the audit of
one of the largest of the Italian banks went to tender and a major accounting ﬁrm bid
for the job at $Nil — and was unsuccessful. Another firm bid $Nil for two years audit
and obtained the assignment. Remarkably, the downward pressure on fees has not, as
far as I can ascertain, given rise to any falling off in the standard of audit procedures
carried out. On the contrary, and somewhat ironically, the profession has been
improving its standards, particularly in the complex areas of computer audits, at the
same time as external pressures might reasonably be expected to be giving rise to some
laxity.
The second factor which has arisen is the virtual disappearance of some of the
higher levels of professional indemnity insurance cover previously available. In the late
seventies and early eighties professional indemnity cover was available in increasing
amounts, albeit at increasing premium levels. The cover was there, however, and
partners in professional firms were able to sleep comfortably, happy in the knowledge
that their professional indemnity cover was reasonably1n excess of any claim likely to
be incurred.
Then in 1984/ 85, following substantial losses either incurred or reserved by
underwriters, we saw the withdrawal of many ofthem from the upper layers of cover of
theworldwide policies of the major accounting firms. Not only this, but we also saw
dramatic increases in the cost of both the primary and secondary layers of insurance.
WhenI say dramatic increases I am talking, in the case ofthe major accounting firms,
aboutincreases of 50% to 100% The premiums for smaller and medium sized ﬁrms,
however, have risen by,1n some cases, 300% to 400%.
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In Australia and the UK, accounting firms have become extremely security
conscious about disclosure of their levels of professional indemnity insurance cover.
Most firms, withjustification, restrict knowledge of the cover taken, to a small number
of senior executive partners Again, however, the profession in the United States has
been almost suicidalin its approach Tender documents for major assignments in the
USA include as a selling point details of the firm’3 professional indemnity cover. While
recognizing this to be a delight for the American legal profession, it is surely the
ultimate folly for the accounting profession.
The third factor was the decision of Rogers J. in the Cambridge Credit case, in
which damages of $145 million were awarded against the auditors of the company.
Here was ajudgment against a firm of auditors, far in excess of any previously handed
down anywhere in the world. Although details of claims settled out of court have
seldom been disclosed, the Cambridge Credit judgment amount was commonly
accepted as having comfortably exceeded the amounts of earlier case settlements. To
make matters worse, the Cambridge Credit judgment was not only many times higher
than the levels of professional indemnity insurance cover held by accounting firms at
the time of the events in question — 1971 — but it also exceeded the levels of cover
available in the market in 1985.
Even the most cursory review of negligence claims against audit firms around the
world indicates that the Cambridge Credit case is most unlikely to be the highest
damages case for very long. The list of current professional indemnity cases which is
attached (Appendix 1, page 55) shows several claims in excess of $100 million and one
case for $1 billion. In addition to having serious concerns about major claims on
domestic assignments, members of international accounting ﬁrms have begun to look
at the documents which tie their individual partnerships together around the world.
Could, for example, a claimant against a major firm in the United States pursue his
claim to the “partners" of that firm in, say, the United Kingdom or Australia?
The auditing profession, therefore, now has a major problem. In a climate of
shrinking cover and increasing premiums which clients are no longer willing to bear,
professional accountants find themselves at considerable financial risk. The profession
is therefore asking itself two questions. Firstly, it is asking itself whether, given that a
great number of the major claims made against auditors in the last decade and a half
have had their origins in fraudulent practices carried out by company executives, it has
failed in its duty by not fighting those cases and thus establishing more clearly, by legal
precedent, that it is not one of the auditor’s primary duties to detect fraud.
Appendix 2, (page 57) which details payment made by Big 8 accounting firms in
the USA in recent years, clearly indicates the trend towards settlement of claims out of
Court. Secondly, is it fair and equitable for the audit opinion to be regarded as an
insurance against risk, or should there be some limitation of the liability faced by
accountants?
For the purposes of discussing the question of the duties of auditors, I will in this
paper deal only with company auditors as opposed to auditors generally. Company
auditors are appointed pursuant to a statutory requirement. Although, therefore, such
appointments are affected by the provisions of the statute, the audit engagement is a
contractual one. The engagement letter might create special duties or extend the
statutory one as may the Articles of Association, but the contractual relationship
remains. The auditor entering into such a contract has a duty of care; he is bound to act
honestly and to exercise reasonable skill and care in carrying out his duties. There is
nothing, however, in legal precedent to support the proposition that company auditors
have a primary duty to detect fraud or even that they are liable simply for sailing to
detect fraud.
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In his Pacific Acceptance case judgment Mr Justice Moffitt said:
There was some debate as to whether any duty to pay due regard to the possibility
of fraud was a primary duty or merely some incidental duty, but I think it is
sufficient to say that the duty referred to exists, as does the consequential duty to
warn, and that each is comprised within the duty to audit with due skill and care.
Moffitt J. went on to say in the same judgment that “...
An auditor pays due regard to the possibility of fraud or error by framing and
carrying out his procedures, having in mind the general and particular possibilities
that exist, to the extent that if a substantial or material error or fraud has crept into
the affairs of the company he has a reasonable expectation that it will be revealed”.
The auditor therefore has a duty to audit with due skill and care, and this includes
an obligation to conduct a company audit bearing in mind the possibility that some
type of material fraud or error may be present. This is a far cry from the proposition
put forward by some that the auditor has a primary duty to detect fraud. Not only is
such a proposition unsupported by both legal precedents and the auditing standards of
the major accounting bodies throughout the world, but it is also quite unsupportable
given the size and complexities of many major company groups today.
The modern audit consists of a series of tests of accounting systems and internal
controls and a veritification of assets and liabilities designed to enable the auditor to
express an opinion on financial accounts. Overall the exercise of professional
judgment continues to be a significant factor for the auditor in forming his opinion. No
person or body of persons can be protected fully against the risk of being deliberately
misled.
This applies not only to government law enforcement authorities, inspectors
appointed under the Companies Code and the courts of law, but also to the auditor.
For this reason the auditor has never held out that his audit will necessarily uncover
fraud and defalcation, although not infrequently it is in fact the means ofdetection and
a deterrent to those with fraudulent intentions
Auditors, with perhaps the inevitable few exceptions, discharge their duties
faithfully. However, their reports are expressions of opinion which, while exercised
with a high degree of skill and judgment, cannot be any more infallible than a legal
decision. Except in the clearest of cases, it is possible to find other experts who, in the
exercise of their skill and judgment, may consider that more, less or different tests
would have been applied by them in arriving at their opinion were they the auditors or
the reporting accountants. The exercise ofjudgment in any circumstances does leave
room for legitimate differences of opinion. The failure on the part of the community to
recognize this, and the human reaction which seeks to shed liability for loss, all
contribute to the present untenable position in relation to liability for professional
negligence.
If it is not a primary duty of the auditor to detect fraud, where does the primary
duty lie? The Uniform Companies Codes leave little doubt in my mind that the primary
responsibility for detection and prevention of fraud lies with management.
Section 269(9) of the Uniform Companies Codes states that:
The directors of a company shall cause to be attached to any accounts required by
section 275 to be laid before an annual general meeting of the company, before the
auditor reports on the accounts under this Part, a statement made, not more than
56 days before the date of the annual general meeting or,~if no annual general
meeting of the company is held within the period within which it is required by
section 240 to be held, not more than 56 days before the end of that period, in
accordance with a resolution of the directors and signed by at least 2 directors —
(a) stating whether, in the opinion ofthe directors —
 (i) the profit and loss account is drawn up so as to give a true and fair view of
the profit or loss of the company for its last financial year (in this
sub-section referred to as “the financial year”);
(ii) the balance sheet is drawn up so as to give a true and fair view of the state
of affairs of the company as at the end of the financial year; and
(iii) at the date of the statement there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the company will be able to pay its debts as and when they fall due;
(b) stating whether the accounts have been made out in accordance with
applicable approved accounting standards;
(0) if the accounts have not been made out in accordance with a particular
applicable approved accounting standard —
(i) stating why the accounts, if made out in accordance with that accounting
standard, would not have given a true and fair view of the matters
required by this section to be dealt with in the accounts; and
(ii) giving particulars of the quantiﬁed ﬁnancial effect on the accounts of the
failure to make out the accounts in accordance with that accounting
standard; and
(d) where the company has been dormant throughout the period commencing at
the commencement of the financial year and ending on the day on which the
statement is made — stating that the company has been dormant.
Several aspects of s. 269(9) require noting. Firstly, s. 269 requires the directors to
report on the accounts required by s. 275, "before the auditor reports on the accounts
under this Part ”. The legal responsibility for preparation of the accounts lies with the
directors and through them with the officers of the company. In an auditors’ Utopia
the directors might present the accounts and the audit would then be commenced. In
reality, however, the situation is far different. Partly because of the complexities of
modern business, partly because of the pressures caused by the need for timely
reporting by companies, and partly because of legal precedents which demand that
audits be continuous through the year, in most cases the audit is either finished or
virtually so, before the directors sit down to consider their 5. 269 report. Indeed it is not
uncommon for directors to seek assurances from the auditors on each of their 5. 269
responsibilities before resolving to sign the directors’ statement. Again the auditing
profession may have, in their efforts to provide service to their clients, done themselves
a disservice by allowing the statutory responsibility of the directors to be subtly shifted
from the directors to the auditor.
Secondly the directors are given a clear statutory responsibility to form an opinion
on — .
a) whether the profit and loss account is “drawn up so as to give a true and fair
view of the profit or loss ...”,
b) whether “the balance sheet is drawn up so as to give a true and fair view of the
state of affairs ...”, and
c) whether “... there are reasonable grounds to believe that the company will be
able to pay its debts as and when they fall due;”.”. '
Read in conjunction with the requirement for directors to report before the
auditor reports, the above duties of directors clearly represent a primary responsibility.
Given this primary responsibility resting on directors and through them company
management, a second primary responsibility must, in logic, also exist, namely that of
prevention and detection of fraud.
Company failures are not caused by auditors but they are often caused by
management. If fraud or error of commercial judgment is a principal cause of a
corporate failure, why are the damages and losses not attributed to the officers
concerned? The obvious answer to this question is that the officers of a company are
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seldom insured against claims for damages caused by their negligence whereas auditors
are. The initial press reports of any major corporate failure seldom include the names
of directors but almost invariably they include the name or names of the audit ﬁrms
involved. One suspects that at times it is only the pressure of printing deadlines which
prevent these reports providing full details of the address for serving of writs, and in
large part the accounting profession has no one to blame but iself for this state of
affairs.
By failing in many cases to contest in the courts the claims for damages arising
from corporate failures, the accounting profession has indirectly assumed the mantle
of responsibility for these failures and effectively transferred the primary responsibility
of the company’s management to present true and fair accounts and to prevent and
detect fraud from management’s shoulders to their own. By failing also to press for
companies to have a requirement for effective internal audit in order to enable
management to have a greater degree of confidence in the accounting records which
give rise to the financial statements, the accounting profession has missed an important
opportunity to emphasize the primary role management has to play in accounts
preparation and presentation.
In this context it is interesting to note that the Finance and Audit Act requires
companies, statutory authorities and departments which fall within thejurisdiction of
the Auditor General to have a system of internal control, a process of internal audit
and an internal review by the head of the department or authority. The auditing
profession would benefit greatly if a requirement for internal audit were built into the
Companies Code for all publicly listed companies. Similarly the profession, in
Australia at least, has failed to appreciate the benefits, both to the company itself and
to the auditor of it, of an effective audit committee.
A properly constituted audit committee should strengthen both the role of the
non-executive directors and the position of the auditors. The review of the company’s
internal controls, which should form an important part of the audit committee’s duties,
must, if properly carried out, minimize the risk of corporate fraud, and the failure by
the accounting profession to urge companies to create audit committees is therefore
difficult to understand. Certainly in the USA there has been a shortage of suitably
qualified, independent, non-executive directors to take up audit committee
appointments, but this is hardly justification for companies and auditors to avoid
setting up an apparatus which can only benefit both.
If the accounting profession has failed to take the necessary steps to establish more
clearly that it is not primarily responsible for the detection of fraud, what then of the
second question? Is it fair and equitable for the audit opinion to be regarded as an
insurance against risk, or should there be some limitation of the liability faced by
accountants?
The financial risk to the accountant in public practice can be extremely high and
unreasonably burdensome. The inability to set any reasonable ceiling on the
contingent liability of the practising accountant is one of the factors inﬂuencing the
underwriter’s assessment of the risk, to which reference has been made earlier.
In spite of the basic changes and improvements in the technical environment in
recent years, the responsibility which, in effect, is assumed by a practitioner is that
neither he, nor his partners, nor his staff will make an error of judgment on which
litigation against him or his firm could succeed. Quite obviously, the potential liability
in most cases is completely beyond the financial capacity of the practitioners involved.
In an article in the June 17, 1985 issue of Forbes Magazine, Rogers J., who
presided over the Cambridge Credit case, in discussing his own judgment on the case,
was quoted as follows:
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What the judgment demonstrates, if sustained on appeal, is that the ﬁnancial I
consequences of auditors’ negligence may not emerge for some years, and that
when they do they may far exceed any amount contemplated at the time of the
negligent act. This makes the task of insuring against loss one of immense
difﬁculty for the auditor, and for the underwriter.
.It’s noteworthy that the Australian decision completely erodes the reasoning
upon which some courts in the US have been extending the liability of auditors.
Recently the New Hampshire Supreme Court said: “The accountant, through the
fee structure, can pass along to his clients the cost of insuring against ﬁnancial loss
sustained by them through reliance upon his negligent misstatement of fact.” How
can the accountant adequately insure when the amount of possible liability is so
speculative? '
Nor is the Australianjudgment an isolated instance of exposure of auditors to
potentially huge liability. Another recent example of auditors being the target of
megasuits occurred earlier this year when the British Government ﬁled a $260
million damage suit for alleged negligence against the auditors of the De Lorean
Motor Co. in Northern Ireland. '
I believe judgments like the Australian decision will increase pressure for
incorporation of auditing ﬁrms to limit the liability of individual partners.
Another result will be heightened interest by any careful company management in
the insurance coverage carried by its auditors.
That in turn will mean a higher premium, not only because of the increased
amount of insurance carried, but also because insurers will now perceive auditor
insurance as a much greater risk than heretofore.
The fact. of the matter is that insurers have already perceived the risk attaching to
professional indemnity insurance as much greater, to the point where a large number
of insurers have simply withdrawn from the market. Those that have remained have
increased their premiums to such an extent that the cost of insurance has become
almost unacceptable. .
While the incorporation of accounting firms referred to by Justice Rogers is one
possibility, I believe the professiOn would readily accept the alternative of a statutorily
imposed limitation of liability, based perhaps on some factor of gross fees, together
with a compulsory level of professional indemnity insurance. Unless.some form of
limitation of liability is achieved soon, and assuming the trend of increasing premiums
and shrinking cover continues, I fear that partners in accounting ﬁrms will take the
obvious course of not insuring at all, while at the same time of divesting themselves of
all major assets. The growing burden of unlimited liability placed upon accountants
will otherwise become a severe deterrent to the development of the public practice
sector of the accountancy profession, and this would be to the serious detriment of the
investing public, which relies in large measure on the special skills and high standard of
service provided by accountants in public practice.
APPENDIX 1
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LITIGATION SETTLED OR PENDING — A WORLDWIDE SURVEY
Case
Continental Illinois — FDIC
Continental Illinois — sholders
Media General
Penn Square — FDIC
Penn Square — PAM
Republic Finance Corp
Drysdale (Manufacturers Hanover)
United American Bank
Giant Stores
Saxon Industries
ESM Govt. Securities
Security America
De Lorean
Baldwin United
Hasbro Bradley
Home State S & L
Financial Corp. of America
Firestone Tyre & Rubber
Tiffany Industries - s’holders
Tiffany Industries — co. suit
American Reserve
Equity Funding
Equity Funding
US Financial
Mill Factors
Hedderwick Sterling Grumbar
Prism
Ruberoid
Alexander Howden
IFIC
Golden Vale Co-op
PMPA
PMPA
Insurance Corp. of Ireland
De Lorean
Winnipeg Mortgage
Packer Floor Coverings
Firm
Ernst & Whinney
Ernst & Whinney
Touche Ross
Peat Marwick
Peat Marwick
Peat Marwick
Arthur Andersen
Ernst & Whinney
Touche Ross
Fox & Co.
Alexander Grant
Coopers & Lybrand
Arthur Andersen
Peat Marwick
Coopers & Lybrand
Arthur Andersen
Arthur Andersen
Coopers & Lybrand
Alexander Grant
Alexander Grant
Coopers & Lybrand
Arthur Andersen
Alexander Grant
Deloitte Haskins & Sells
Peat Marwick
Touche Ross
Coopers & Lybrand
Ernst & Whinney
Arthur Andersen
Ernst & Whinney
Arthur Young
Midgley Snelling
Arthur Andersen
Oliver Freaney (8&0)
Stokes Kennedy Crowley
Ernst & Whinney
Arthur Andersen
Deloitte Haskins & Sells
Coopers & Lybrand
Country
USA
USA
USA .
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA/UK/Eire
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA)
USA)
USA)
USA
USA
UK
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
UK/ Ireland
Canada
Canada
Amount
$220m
Unspeciﬁed
$75m
$135m
'$260m
$72m
$17m
Unspeciﬁed
$4m
$108m
$Ibn
$3m
$260m
Unspecified
$l9m
$l I5m
Unspeciﬁed
$I.2m
85m
Unspecified
$10m+
$11.8m
c.$3m
$10m+
35m
850,000 Pds
Unspeciﬁed
8.9m Pds
167m Pds
6.6m Pds
I.2m I Pds
Unspeciﬁed
Unspeciﬁed
90m 1 Pds
100m Pds
C35.8m
C$360,000
Status
' Pending
Pending
Pending _
Pending
Pending
Pending
Jury award
Pending
Pending
Comments
I984 — Ofﬁcers also cited
I984
I984
I984
PM is countersuing
I984
I985 — Being appealed
I984
I983
Mostly settled Settlement amounts
Pending
Settlement
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Settlement
Pending
Pending
Pending
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Pending
Pending
Pending
Settlement
Pending
Pending
Pending
Expected
Pending
Pending
Pending
“much lower”
I2 suits in all. Losses
$315m
I985
British Govt. may
withdraw US suit
I984
I985
I985 — ESM related
I984 — Class action
I985 settlement
Grant countersuing
\
19705 case
l970s case
I9705 case
I960s case
I984 settlement
I985
I985
I984 — AY is suing
directors
I983
I984
I985 — Administrator’s suit
I985 — Administrator's suit
Writ threatened
Liquidators’ writ. Likely
be tried in N. Ireland
I985 — Class action
I984
56 APPENDIX 1, continued
Case a Firm Country . Amount Status Comments
Cambridge Credit Fell & Starkey Australia A$l45m Court award I985 4 Being appealed
Gollin ~ Kent Brierley Australia A$6m Settlement 1982
Securitibank Coopers & Lybrand New Zealand NZ$6m Pending |98l
NOTE: The preceding list represents a selection only. It is not comprehensive.
SOURCEz‘ International Accounting Bulletin — April 1985.
.APPENDIX 2 ,
57
BIG EIGHT AUDIT-RELATED PAYOUTS IN THE US
‘ 1984 fees Ranking No. of
Value
Firm ' $ million byfees payouts
$
1," , Arthur Andersen 1,020 1 16 137,
089,359
2. Peat Marwick ‘ 909 2 2
19,400,000
3. Ernst & Whinney 712 3 Not known
6,020,550
4. Deloitte Haskins & Sells 470 7 23 , . 4,
997,585
, 5. Coopers & Lybrand 690* 4 26
4,375,850
6. Price Waterhouse 550* 5 2 3,
500,000
7. Touche Ross 430 8 1
2,250,000
8 Arthur Young , 490* 6 2 . ~ 1,490,
000
‘ Estimated
NOTES: Touche Ross has excluded an unknown number of settlemen
ts under
$500,000, the total cost of which “would not be material in the aggregate".
Peat Marwiclr has excluded an unknown number of settlements under
$500,000 the total cost of which “did not exceed $500,000 in any one year”.
Price,Waterhouse has excluded an unknown number of settlements under
$1,000,000, the total cost of which did not exceed $lm in any one year.
The total value of settlements for each firm is based on information
gathered by the SEC for the Dingell investigation and was provided by the
firms themselves. The remaining payout data is based on IAB’s own
reseaich. ‘
SOURCE: International Accounting Bulletin — April 1985.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
K. J. Rennie
The first thing I would like to say is that I am not advocating audit ﬁrms fighting
every action against them through the courts. In most cases settlement out of court is
not only the wisest but the most practical solution to the problem. However, I am of the
view that the profession could have benefited greatly, if more cases had beencontested
in court in recent years and in the process established by legal precedent what the
professional bodies in all of the major countries believe on this subject. I think it is
worth quoting from, in this case, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia
AUP l6: '
The responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud and error rests with
management through the implementation and continued operation of an
adequate system of internal control. Such a system reduces, but does not eliminate
the possibility of fraud or error. The objective of an audit of financial information
is to enable an auditor to express an opinion on such financial information. In
forming his opinion, the auditor carries out procedures designed to obtain
evidence that will provide reasonable assurance that the financial information is
properly stated in all material respects. Consequently, the auditor seeks
reasonable assurance that fraud or error, which may be material to the financial
information has not occurred or that if it has occurred the effect of fraud is
properly reﬂected in the financial information or the error is corrected. The
auditor, therefore, should plan his audit so that he has a reasonable expectation of
detecting material misstatements in the financial information resulting from fraud
or error. The degree of assurance of detecting errors would normally be higher
than that of detecting fraud, since fraud is usually accompanied by acts specifically
designed to conceal its existence. Due to the inherent limitations of an audit, there
is a possibility that material misstatements of the financial information resulting
from fraud and to a lesser extent error may not be detected. The subsequent
discovery of material misstatement of the financial information resulting from
fraud or error existing during the period covered by the auditor’s report does not
in itself indicate that the auditor has failed to adhere to the basic principles
governing an audit.
The question of whether the auditor has adhered to the basic principles
governing an audit, is determined by the adequacy of the procedures undertaken
in the circumstances and the suitability of the auditor’s report based on the results
of these procedures. '
One has only to look at some of the main cases quoted in the debate, about the
extent of the auditor’s duty ot detect fraud, e.g., the Royal British Bank case (1859), the
London and General Bank case (1895), the Kingston Cottonmill Company case (1896)
to see that we are somewhat lacking in case law decided on the basis of modern audit
techniques. At least the Paciﬁc Acceptance case which was decided in 1970 addressed
the issue in some degree, and Mofﬁt J. said in his judgment:
An auditor pays due regard to the possibility of fraud or error, by framing and
carrying out his procedures, having in mind the general and particular possibilities
that exist to the extent that if a substantial or material error or fraud has crept into
the affairs of the company, he has a reasonable expectation that it will be revealed.
One of the difficulties the auditing profession faces, as Mr O’Donnell has pointed
out, is trying to bridge the gap between the auditor’s understanding of his duties, as
specified in AUP l6, and the public’s and directors’ and shareholders’ perception of
what is involved in a modern audit. As a profession we have probably not spent
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sufficient time informing and ' educating these groups in just what is involved in a
modern audit. Mr O’Donnell has referred extensively to this problem. As a profession,
I think we must face up to the likelihood that very few shareholders, and a great
number ofdirectors for that matter, would have very little, if any, understanding of the
complexities of a modern audit. To suggest that an auditor faced with auditing a group
of companies with anything up to four or five hundred subsidiaries, inter-company
transactions, minority interests, overseas transactions, mid-accounting period
acquisitions and disposals, plus very tight reporting deadlines, can be expected to fulfil
a primary obligation or responsibility to detect fraud is, in my View, quite hopelessly
unrealistic.
I have made mention in my paper of the recent practice of putting audits out for
tender and noted some of the excesses that this practice is producing. Mr Cooke in his
paper, dealt extensively with the question of independence of the auditor, when he is
involved in a dual role for a client company. He also referred to the view that audit
tendering is a threat to independence, and I would suggest that it is potentially a much
greater risk to the auditor’s independence than any mentioned by Mr Cooke in his
paper. When faced with a contentious issue or a difficult disclosure problem or the
treatment of a particular accounting item in the accounts, the threat of the audit being
put out to tender can be a real concern, and a cause for undue pressure on the auditor.
Mr Cooke also referred to the strengthening of the auditor’s appointment by 5.282 of
the Companies Code. I agree that perhaps that was the purpose of 5.282 but the reality
is far from that and it isjust as easy to get rid ofa firm of auditors these days, as it was
prior to the new code.
On a question of independence, I think it is probably fair to say that Mr
O’Donnell, when he was the NSW Auditor-General, was probably the only really
independent auditor in New South Wales. Unfortunately, the accountant in public
practice does not have the luxury of a statutory appointment. In fact, although the
auditor reports to the shareholders, his appointment is controlled by the directors, the
very people whose performance is reﬂected in the annual results on which the auditor
reports. .
I have also mentioned the crisis which is arising in the area of professional
indemnity insurance, and I really cannot stress the importance of this matter enough.
Partners in accounting firms are already paying substantial sums for their insurance
cover, and while the premiums are increasing rapidly, the cover available is shrinking
in equally dramatic terms. Even a cursory look at the list of recent pay-outs, as I quoted
in my paper (Appendix 1, page 55) will show why underwriters are very quickly
abandoning this strand of business. If even one or two of the major cases which are
pending against audit firms go against those firms, I believe the professional indemnity
insurance market could dry up completely. Not only that, but in the list of cases I have
quoted from, there are no less than eight cases which are for sums way in excess of the
professional indemnity insurance cover which is available in the market today. There is
a very real prospect, if things continue the way they are going, of a major accounting
firm finding all of its partners subject to bankruptcy proceedings. I cannot believe that
that is going to be anything other than a severe deterrent to the development of the
public practice sector of the accounting profession. And this, in turn, will be to the
serious detriment of the investing public.
What of the role of the executive directors in the detection of fraud? It never ceases
to amaze me how easily management seems to avoid its responsibility for the detection
and prevention of fraud despite the fact that the management has the primary
responsibility for preparing the accounts of a company so as to give a true and fair view
of its results on the balance sheet. When a fraud is discovered, it is more often than not
the auditor who is blamed for his failure to uncover the fraud. The reason for this is
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quite clear. Management are very seldom insured against claims for damages caused
by their negligence. The load, therefore, switches to the auditor and the ﬁnancial risk
can be extremely high and unreasonably burdensome. . ~ .
In spite of the changes and improvements in the technical environment in recent
years the responsibility, which in effect is assumed by the practitioner, is that neither he
nor his partners, nor his staff will make an error of judgment on- which litigation
against him or his firm could succeed. In these circumstances, I have to ask, is it fair
and equitable for the audit opinion to be-regarded as an insurance against risk? I say
No. Secondly, should there be some limitation of the liability faced by auditors? and I
say, Yes. .
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SOME COMMENTS ON MR COOKE’S PAPER: “CAN ACCOUNTANTS
REGULATE THEMSELVES?”
F.L. Clarke, Ph.D., B.Ec., F.A.S.A., C.P.A., A.G.I.S.
Associate Professor of Accounting, Head ofDepartment,
The University of Sydney
Accounting Regulation and Corporate Crime
Presumably this seminar is to consider the contribution of accounting practices to
the perpetration of corporate fraud and fraud induced collapse. It is curious that no
evidence of such a contribution is given in Mr Cooke’s paper. It seems to be assumed.
No casual connections between non-compliance with, or non-existence of, accounting
standards and fraud or collapse are shown by him.
Mr Cooke’s evaluation of accountants’ self regulation proceeds as if we have to
accept the status quo with respect to the tasks confronting auditors and the general set
of circumstances in which they form their “opinion” on the truth and fairness of
accounts. Independence is shown to be as slippery to define as it is to know when it has
been achieved. Virtually no attention is directed towards reducing the number of
accounting variables auditors have to deal with. The frequent cry of regulators is far
more, and more detailed, accounting standards to cover different types of transactions
and their financial consequences. That is consistent with the regulatory mode of
“putting out fires”. No doubt regulatory behaviour of that kind affords future
protection to some parties. It equally is capable of exposing others to considerable risk.
The greater the number of separate matters auditors have to evaluate, for example, the
greater the risk that they may have to compromise their independence.
Too much of what is written, and far too much of the discussion of auditors’
problems, accepts the status quo. Recently at the AAANZ Conference NSCS
Chairman Bosch bemoaned the state of accounting. He implied that more, tighter,
accounting standards were required. He alluded to such a need if accounts were to have
“credibility”. Mr Cooke appears to have much the same view. He refers to the “... need
for universally accepted and legally enforceable accounting standards” (p. 18). But, like
those who utter similar sentiments, he gives no evidence that either “acceptability” and
“enforceability” of accounting standards are necessary and sufﬁcient for the
prevention of accounting manipulation. Nor is there presented any evidence that
accountants’ compliance with prescribed standards will produce financial data which
are serviceable for users needs. Of course, “credibility”, “acceptability” and
“enforceability” possibly would make the regulators’ task easier than it is at the
moment. Ease of regulation, however, does not guarantee that accounting data are
serviceable in the uses ordinarily made of them.
Regulation Through Many Standards
Regulation of accounting is only a means to an end. The desired end appears
unequivocal — the presentation to the public of financial data which truly indicate the
wealth and progress of business entities. Regulation, control over what accounts
contain, control over how data are processed, are not uniquely or naturally linked to
serviceable financial disclosures.
For “regulation”, per se, can be achieved also through compelling compliance with
defective, non-operative, meaningless, accounting standards and financial disclosures.
Some of the standards currently in place facilitate manipulation. They ensure
deceptive disclosures. They compel accountants to report as “assets” amounts which
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cannot legally be claimed from anyone at that time and possibly at no time in the future
— Future Income Tax Benefits, for example (under AAS 3), and to report similar
items as unenforceable “liabilities” against the company — Provision for Deferred
Income Tax, for instance. Depreciation is to be charged, even where the related asset is
appreciating (AAS 4). The ﬁnancial consequences of some transactions must be
reported below the operating profit line as extraordinary, though the frequency of such
“extraordinary” transactions may make them as much a part of trading as anything
else the company does (AAS l). The Companies Code restricts consolidation
procedures to the circumstance of a particular type of intercorporate relationship - it
thereby forces some investments in company shares to be accounted for differently
from one another (55.226; 269(3)). The Seventh Schedule to the Regulations requires
the elimination of the effect of inter-company transactions (Para. 10(2)), even though
the unadjusted record is indicative of the actual financial outcome. The Code
(s.269(7)(c)) also permits the disclosure of “non-current assets” at amounts up to
the amount that it would have been reasonable for the company to expend to acquire
the asset as at the end of the financial year”, — yet the price a company would face to
acquire an asset it already possesses, is most unlikely to be indicative of the money’s
worth of what it currently has, ever had in the past, or is likely to have in the future.
Setting standards for virtually every conceivable commercial transaction or
situation is the practice commonly pursued by regulators. Yet no evidence has been
presented that it is either necessary or sufficient for the improvement of the quality of
accounting or the prevention of fraudulent manipulation of ﬁnancial data. The
evidence is that the quality, the serviceability, of accounting data is no better in the
US. under the bank of FASB standards, than it is in Australia with only a quarter as
many. The number of outstanding claims against auditors suggests the FASB’s work
has been a boon for the lawyers and that the users of financial data have not been all
that well served. (See the list of claims pending in Rennie’s paper.)
The point is that perhaps we have too many separate prescriptions. Perhaps in this
seminar we should explore the possibility of reducing the number of separate
standards. No one has shown that compliance with the then existing prescriptions,
recommendations, or merely with the common, conventional, practices of the day,
would have prevented some of the frauds and company collapses experienced since the
early 19605. To the contrary, a number of Inspectors’ Reports have been quite scathing
of some conventionally approved practices. And reports of the incidence of non-
compliance with accounting standards over the years, have not been accompanied by
reports of the comparable incidence of related corporate frauds or collapses. The
evidence seems to support a case for less speciﬁc standards, not more!
Serviceability, Consumerism and Accounting Data
Those who use accounting data are consumers of them. Controls, specifications,
to regulate the minimum acceptable, serviceable, quality of other consumer products
or services rarely specify production procedures. Invariably, only the necessary quality
of the end-product is speciﬁed. The specification refers to the necessary (and by
implication, the sufficient) qualities, the necessary physical characteristics, the
necessary technical features, which ensure that the end-product is of merchantable
quality, is fit for consumption, is serviceable in those uses ordinarily made of it.
Published financial data in income accounts and balance sheets are the end-
products of accounting. Specification of the necessary and sufficient features data
must have to be serviceable is much more an imperative than the quest for standard
production procedures. And we can identify a considerable number of those uses.
Casual observation of the financial press, company reports, reports from brokers,
from the stock exchanges and mercantile agencies, shows that data drawn directly
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from published company reports are used to assess: solvency; liquidity; the relative
debt to equity financing; corporate wealth; rate of return on capital employed, rate of
return on assets employed; the nature, amount and composition of a company’s assets
and equities; its debt cover, and the like. What, if any, use is made of those calculations
and assessments, nobody can know. Essentially that is a private affair. 011 how they
could enter certain types of decisions. we can theorize. On whether they enter decision
making, we can only speculate. But the fact remains, published financial data are so
used, and every test of reasonableness, truth and fairness, in consumerism would seem
to suggest that they ought to be serviceable for those purposes.
Provided data have those features, are users likely to be concerned over which of
many different accounting procedures was adopted to achieve that end? Quite likely,
no! In other fields of consumerism one proceeds to use an end-product without regard
for (in most instances, without any knowledge of) how it was produced. Who, for
example, cares how canned peas have been processed, provided when they come off the
shelf they are fit for human consumption? Provided the product satisfies the various
tests relating to such things, it is serviceable, of merchantable quality, and no sensible
consumer gives another thought to the matter. The sytem appears to work very
effectively. Perhaps common, “standard”, methods evolve as the best, most economic,
most technically efficient, means of processing and presenting products. New entrants
to the industry may well follow such a lead given by those already established in it.
Known deviations from the common practice might reasonably prompt a closer look
at the end product. If so, well and good. But nothing is lost if it does not eventuate. And
if many methods of achieving a standard quality end product co-exist, no one is
harmed.
Imposing only one such serviceability standard is entirely consistent with the
objective sought through the proliferation of standards. A sole serviceability standard
possibly could achieve more effective regulation than currently enjoyed, with
considerably less anxiety to all concerned, than either the batch of standards currently
in place, or with those promised for the future. A case for such a move was succintly put
in the Report of the Accounting Standards Review Committee back in 1978. The
suggestion is not to reduce effective regulation. It is to change its modus operandi, to
focus attention on its social objectives, to free the system of dysfunctional minutiae, to
give regulation some real teeth.
The Servieeability Criterion
Monitoring the achievement of a specified end—product quality works in other,
conventionally recognised, areas of consumerism. Yet, the regulators of, the
watchdogs over, accounting and financial disclosure continue to pursue the
specification and enforcement of separate detailed procedures. The necessary and
sufficient accounting serviceability criterion has not been pursued publicly by either
standard setters or standard seekers. Inexplicably, it has not been pursued by the
standard users — the rank and file of the accounting profession.
With respect to accounting, Mr Cooke’s paper gives no indication that regulation
could proceed other than through the proliferation of prescriptive standards. The
“peer review” refers to is effected through the assessment of compliance with current
standards. It is as likely to entrench existing practices, as to question and dislodge them
if they warrant it. That was shown as far back as in the defence of Mr Moreland in the
Royal Mail case. Peer review offers little hope for fundamental change. The status quo
is unlikely to be questioned seriously by its operation. Nor is the status quo likely to be
disturbed if we continue to use only the conventional framework to address the
problems of regulation. The prospect of more accounting variables, more standard
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prescriptions, their attendant variant interpretations and permissible caveats, shoul
d
be comforting for the manipulators looking for loopholes. For the auditor, it is col
d
comfort. For the consumer, it merely promises more of what they hav
e become
accustomed to! ~
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. I do not want to talk at any length. My point in making this submission is that
when I read Mr Cooke’s paper, I had this feeling of déjavu, here it goes again.
Whenever a group of accountants or regulators in the corporate area get together
and start talking about accounting or accounting regulation, invariably the topic
quickly turns to the suggestion of having more and more detailed accounting
standards. Now, that is certainly the conventional pattern of regulating the accounting
profession. But it seems to me that a forum like this ought to consider the record of
almost abject failure that model of regulation has in respect of improving the quality of
accounting.
I do not think anyone could provide evidence, which suggests that the AICPA of
the United States with its programme of Accounting Principle Bulletins, or the FASB
(which has now superceded it) with its seventy four (or whatever it is up to last night)
Standards imposed on the profession there; or the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales, its affiliated bodies in U.K. with their Standards (about twenty
odd), or the profession here with what we currently have, have been very successful in
producing financial information which is of a quality that the public, at large, are
generally satisfied with. Or in fact, presumably, that the profession is satisfied with, or
in fact, that the government is satisfied with. Otherwise we would not be in the present
position in Australia, when we at last have two approved accounting standards. That
does not mean, of course, that those standards necessarily improve the quality of
accounting information. But we do have two approved accounting standards. In the
United States they have made so much progress with their standards and their
“Standards Program”, that they have been able to decide they must abandon their
program to discover a conceptual framework for accounting. So, presumably, they
have not even discovered, despite their standards, what accounting is all about!
The point I make in the paper is that we should challenge the conventional model
of trying to regulate accounting and the accounting profession.
I suggest to you that perhaps an alternative strategy might be to have less
standards or even no speciﬁc standards, on how to do this, that, and the other, but to
have perhaps an overall “quality standard” which auditors would have to assess the
product of. It seems to me that the analogy I draw in the paper between the use of
accounting data and other areas ofconsumerism is valid. In consumerism the concern
is that the end product will be of merchantable quality fit for the purposes for which it
is normally used. That would seem to me to be not an unreasonable sort oftest to apply
to the end products of the accounting process, i.e. to published ﬁnancial statements,
balance sheets and income statements. It is a challenge that I suggest that a forum like
this should seriously consider.
I have a few other comments that I commend to you. The question of peer review I
think is obviously worthwhile exploring. But peer review is very old. It was in fact the
major criterion which enabled Mr Moreland to be found not guilty in the Royal Mail
case some fifty years ago. I doubt very much whether it really amounts to any more
than a process by which the quality of financial information would be assessed in terms
of the accounting standards as they exist at the day. I cannot see much promise for it.
And I cannot see much promise for the improvement in the quality of financial
information in the sense of it being a product that consumers make use of, unless we
consider alternative strategies. One alternative strategy would be to have less standards
not more. I also think that that would help considerably the problem that the auditors
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face at the moment with all the standards with which they have to comply and
everything else. It seems very much to me that auditors are on a “mission impossible”.
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REPORTING BY AUDITORS
Michael Lulan. . .
Investigation Division .
' Corporate'Affairs Commission
sub-sections 285(9) and (10) of the Companies ‘.(NSW) Code set out various
requirements as to the reporting by auditors to the Corporate Affairs Commission.
Whereas a number of reports are received by the Commission pursuant to sub-section
285(9) very few reports are received pursuant to sub-section 285 (10). I would like to
know if auditors have a view as to why this is so. ‘
The relevant sub-sections.(9) and (10) of S285 are as follows: '
(9) If an auditor of a company becomes aware that the company or the directors
has or have made default in complying with section 240 or the provisions of
section 275 relating to the laying of accounts or group accounts before the
annual general meeting of the company, the auditor shall immediately inform
the Commission by notice in writing and, if accounts or group accounts have
been prepared and audited, send to the Commission a copy of the accounts or
group accounts and of his report on the accounts or group accounts.
(10) Except in a case which sub-section (9) applies, if an auditor, in the course of
the performance of his duties as auditor of a company, is satisfied that —
(a) there has been contravention of, or failure to comply with, any of the
provisions of this Code; and
(b) the circumstances are such that in his opinion the matter has not been or
will not be adequately dealt with~ by comment in his report on the
accounts or group accounts or by bringing the matter to the notice of the
directors of the company or, if the company is a subsidiary, of the
directors of any corporation .of which the company is a subsidiary.
he shall forwith report the matter to the Commission by notice in writing.
One example of an auditor not reporting that I have been involved ,with during the
past few years concerned an investigation by the Corporate Affairs Commission.
The matter was referred to the Commission by a source otherthan the auditor. It
was quite evident to me that if certain facts were reported to the Commission by the
auditor, at the time the auditor became aware of them, the conviction of directors for
serious offences would have happened at least twelve months sooner. The auditors
advised that they did not report to the Commission because even though they had
“strong suspicion” they were not “satisfied” that an offence had been committed.
Furthermore they were concerned that their client may have sued them if they had
reported the matter. - '
The seminar may wish to discuss whether or not the legislation should be changed
to make it easier for auditors to report to the Commission. Perhaps if an auditor has
reason to believe an offence may have been committed rather than have to be
“satisfied” of the contravention more matters would be reported. Auditors may require
more protection under the legislation if they do report in good faith.
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Michael Lulan i
Why are so fewreports received by the Corporate Affairs Commission from
auditors1n relation to breaches of the Company Code as required by the legislation? If
we look at some of the liquidator reports received by the Commission in relation to
failed companies they indicate that breaches do occur in the commercial world — they
(the breaches/ offences) are there Why are they not reported by auditors? ThatIs my
question, and perhaps it might invite comment
Do we need a change1n the legislation or are there other reasons for this?
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E.J. Shields, Q. C., Senior Public Defender
I suppose it can be said that any person who enters the professions these days does
so realising the enormous risk he runs if he does not carry out his professional duties
not only properly, but in a way which would be regarded as reasonable by his fellow
professionals ofgood standing and repute. In this regard, accountants and their senior
branch of auditors stand in no different position to the lawyer, the doctor or the dentist
who is negligent in the performance of his professional skills. Having said this, I just
wonder how much of the papers presented on behalf of the profession at this seminar
(leaving out Chief Inspector Sing) really relate to the question of crime and the
accountancy profession and how much relates to an attempt at self-justification. I
believe that I can speak with some limited authority in relation to this matter as I spent
some seven and a half years as the legal member of the Public Accountant’s
Registration Board, and as such I sat, as its Chairman when it conducted inquiries into
the professional conduct of registered public accountants and, in earlier days,
company auditors and liquidators. A great deal has been said about the notorious
cases which have received publicity and which are merely cases where the auditors
concerned have fallen short in their duty to take care in the exercise of their functions,
that is they have been negligent.
I am just as concerned about the smaller company and its audit. The law of
negligence seems to have developed at a quickening pace since the early 1930’s and
courts have been astute to lay down the appropriate test of negligence for the
community as a whole, and to apply that test to particular situations, whether they be
motor car accidents, auditors, valuers, lawyers, or the ordinary artisan who does work
on the repair of one’s car or house. The duty of care owed by an auditor (and who are
an auditor’s “neighbours”?) must depend upon each set of circumstances. It is,
however, important to point out that the company accountant is paid by the company
and owes his duty to the directors and management of that company in the preparation
of the company’s accounts. Presumably, he would do nothing which was fraudulent or
criminal in any way in the preparation of those accounts. However, the auditor is not
entitled to the benefit of any such presumption when he comes to look over the
accounts in the affairs of the company. The auditor, even though he be paid by the
company, owes his duty to the company’s shareholders and creditors and to people
outside the company who are likely to rely upon the auditor’s report and opinion as to
the ﬁnancial stability and viability of the company.
I’m afraid that I am unable to agree with many of the matters raised by Mr Rennie,
who has so carefully set out so much in his paper. Whilst his s.269 argument is
attractive on the face of it, it is not, in my opinion, sound. It is the primary duty of the
company and its accountant to prepare accounts and if possible to detect fraud. Once,
however, those accounts have been prepared and completed, whether this be a result of
an ongoing audit or an audit at the end of the financial year, the auditor then has a duty
to examine those accounts with all of the competency and skill at his command. And
whilst, as he says, most auditors would go about their duties faithfully, this is not of
itself sufficient. They should bring to bear all their professional experience and training
upon the matter in hand. Doubtless, few auditors would approach an audit with the
aim of detecting fraud. But if there were to be any suggestion of this, then it is the
auditor’s duty to uncover this fraud. As my good friend Jack O’Donnell would say, if
you smell stinking fish, you dig to ﬁnd out what is causing the smell.
This is what I believe His Honour Mr Justice Moffitt meant in the passage quoted
from his judgment in Paciﬁc Acceptance at page 51 in Mr Rennie’s paper. It matters
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not whether it is a primary or secondary duty, iffraud exists it is the duty of the auditor
to uncover it. No one, however, would suggest that if directors or management have by
some completely foolproof manipulation devised a scheme to defraud the company,
which no reasonable auditor exercising his ordinary skill and care could detect, any
court could hold that auditor responsible for failing to detect this fraud. This, of
course, has not been the result in most of the decided cases where the courts have held
that the auditor concerned has not exhibited that standard of care that the law requires
of and reposes in him.
Mr Rennie has stated a truism at page 52 that the company failures are not caused
by auditors but are often caused by management. One has to doubt the accuracy of this
particularly where an auditor, in the exercise of ordinary skill and prudence, at an early
stage in his auditing of the company’s affairs can bring to light a position which if
stopped early would untimately prevent the downfall of the company, Here, I instance
an auditor who makes inadequate provision over several years for doubtful or for bad
debts and leads not only the company, but the creditors to think that the company has
a much greater viability than it actually has. I have seen cases, where through
negligence, ignorance, or perhaps even complicity in the schemes of management, the
auditor’s failure to report thereon has over a period of years resulted in the ultimate
collapse of the company. At the end of the day the auditor should find himself in a
position where he can give an unqualified report. If he cannot do so, he should say so
and set out the qualifications. If he has any doubts he should say so, and in such a way
will he be protected. It may well be that the auditor who qualiﬁes a report may place his
position as company auditor in jeopardy, but surely this is far better to do than to
acquiesce in a position which ultimately leads to a large damages action.
I believe that the question of limited liability for accountants or indeed for any
other professional person is a retrogressive step. It is merely a way of protecting oneself
against one’s own incompetence and negligence and is not to be countenanced.
Imagine being operated upon for appendicitis by Dr XYZ Limited? I am devasted by
the penultimate paragraph of Mr Rennie’s paper (page 54). It is, it seems to me, a.
confession that the accountancy profession cannot give a proper account of itself, and
that it is at all times looking over its shoulder at the consequences of the negligent
performance of its duties by divesting itself of their wealth and so they become men of
straw.
‘ I believe that the public expects the following:
1. that those who undertake duties as auditors will be absolutely independent;
2. that those who undertake duties as auditors will be thoroughly competent in
their chosen profession;
3.‘ that those who take on the duties of auditors will be thoroughly knowledgable
in the proper and current procedures in relation to auditing;
4. that those who undertake the duties of auditors will be painstaking in the
carrying out of those duties, no matter whether the fee agreed upon is
adequate to cover the work they will ultimately have to perform;
5. that those who undertake the duties of auditors will act honestly towards
those to whom they owe a duty of care, and
6. that they will comply with the ethical standards of their respective professions.
An auditor who acts in this way will answer the question posed by Mr O’Donnell
on page 24, and will do his best to hold back the, tide of crime as posed by him at page
25. Not only this, but he will also be able to report in a much more positive way that the
matters or transactions are “probably correct” as Mr O’Donnell says at page 28 of his-
paper.
In conclusion might I say that I believe that this profession, whilst it does an
admirablejob amongst its own individual bodies, cannot regulat itself as a whole. And
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whilst one would deprecate the bureaucratic interference which has been spoken of,
there should be some form of regulation ofthe profession as a whole and some form of
disciplinary proceedings as opposed merely to liability to Common Law for
negligence.
Professor Murray Wells, Head of Graduate School of Management and Public Policy,
The University of Sydney
I think I am wearing my professional hat this evening, and wearing that hat I think
every member of the profession will agree with the six beliefs that we have just heard.
But I do not think we could agree with the analogy of the Surgeon Pty. Ltd. limiting his
liability. The point is that we are in quite different circumstances where members of the
profession, through their partnerships in particular, are now being found liable for
damages in things with which they were not directly concerned but which arose
because they affected a whole community of people — not just a sole patient. I think
also the analogy overlooks the danger which auditors face when they are asked, as Mr
Cooke suggested, to give early warning of possible failure. One of the difficulties that
auditors have is that it is very easy for them to give self-fulfilling prophecies. And I
think, not as a practicing auditor but as one who meets with them frequently, the thing
that worries auditors is that when they try to give early warning of possible failure they
may, in doing that, leave themselves open to a charge that they brought about the
failure of the company by their excessive caution.
Mr Cooke mentioned the public concern with the independence of auditors and I
am not aware of any evidence, other than in the occasional large failure, of public
concern about the independence issue which he raises, in particular about the matter of
auditors carrying out other work for their audit clients. I am not aware of any evidence
that the peer reviews of the United States has achieved anything except to produce a
merry-go-round for large sums of money; and I am not aware of any evidence that the
position in Holland is any better than it is in Australia. In Holland, as I am sure you are
aware, auditors are not allowed to undertake non-audit work for their audit clients. I
ﬁnd it curious that it should be Mr Cooke who produced this because, if I can wheel a
particular barrow which Mr Cooke knows I am interested in, when the profession
sought to achieve restriction on the designation “Accountants”, as he mentioned in his
paper, the Corporate Affairs Commission came back and asked where was the
evidence of public concern. May I suggest, Mr Cooke, that you cannot have it both
ways.
I would also like to ask what is the scope for co-regulation which Mr Cooke
suggested, and which I wholeheartedly endorse, when in the present form of the
registration of auditrs there is no scope whatsoever for co-regulation? It is “regulation”
full stop. In the proposed changes to the Public Accountants ’Registration Act there is
no capacity for co-regulation — again it is “regulation”, full stop.
Mr Rennie has pointed to the dangers of audit tendering and I agree with him. I
think that is the greatest danger facing the audit profession. It is the greatest danger
because of the possibility that it puts the auditor in the difficult position that he
referred to. But, Mr Rennie, is not the answer in the hands of the auditors to say if you
do not like the heat get out of the kitchen? For the life of me, I do not understand why
audit firms tender forjobs.
Dr Waldemar Niemotko -
I would like to raise a point which would probably be of particular interest to Mr
Cooke. This resulted from a research project I was involved in at Columbia University,
New York, where the emphasis was put on legal measures to prevent the illegal uses of
computers. Nowadays, the computerised systems involve business, banking, insurance
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companies, re-insurance and auditors as essential components ofthis system to help to
prevent, or for some reasons to be more lenient towards, the discoveries they would
take in the course of performing their profession.
My question is, whether you agree that computer software and computer
experience would be essential as a tool to set up proper rules in order to prevent any
abuses in the area discussed, particularly considering the transnational components of
many transactions, many Australian subsidiaries having co-operation with overseas
headquarters, where solicitors or corporate counsel could exploit any great area to the
detriment of the economy of Australia?
J. C. Cooke
In relation to the last point, I am not very clear onjust exactly what was required of
me. Can I say that, as far as the use of computers goes, there is no reason that I am
aware of why more use ought not to be made of them. Thus, if there is some way,
through the use of computers to assist either the auditor in performing his duties or in
the regulator, whoever it might be, in establishing what might have occured and taking
whatever remedies might be available it should be used. Whether that answers the
point raised I am not sure.
Jeff Bergman, Management and Computer Audit Consultant
I am involved in computer audit and it would be of interest to the seminar, to know
that we have very clear audit standards now internationally published in June 1985:
(Australia being one of the first cabs off the rank), AB 4, 4.0, 4.1, and 4.2 which were
published through the Accounting Research Foundation in March 1984. There are lots
of standards relating to the auditor’s responsibility and requirements in terms of
computers and I think that legal issues, which are beyond the scope of my knowledge,
possibly will follow if and when there is a court case to test whether adequate attention
is given to the software and the auditability of the system in its own right. There are
standards available and these have not been tested.
Jeff Mayne, Information Systems Audit and Security
I too, like Jeff Bergman, provide a role to chartered accountancy firms in assisting
them to audit through the computer instead of auditing around it. I think the biggest
problem facing the chartered accountancy profession today is the lack of skills within
the profession to actually grasp these concepts in these standards. It is not going to be
accomplished overnight, but is something which the profession is starting to address
and, unfortunately, will only be addressed over a long period of time.
J. C. Cooke
I would like to comment on Mr Clarke’s paper (pages 61 to 64). It is a very
interesting paper, but I have hardly had a chance to look at it very closely. I ﬁnd it a ﬁne
theory to suggest that we would all be better off if there were fewer standards or one
global standard which might set out general principles by which the accounting
profession would operate. I wonder if it would work all that well in practice. History
suggests otherwise. There probably needs to be much more concentrated control than
that (which might not sound terribly unusual coming from a regulator). I would
certainly need some convincing that fewer standards could in effect work, but it is an
interesting proposition and one that no doubt deserves some consideration. It is
something that I suppose should have emanated from the profession in the ﬁrst
instance.
He talks of setting standards for virtually every conceivable commercial
transaction or situation, that being the practice commonly being pursued by regulators.
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What we are talking about here, of course, is the Accounting Standards Review Board,
and I do not think that there is any evidence to suggest that that is the approach
, adopted by the Board. It might be quite otherwise, and the Board may well adopt a
view which is closer to his own than to the approach adopted by the accounting bodies
to date. I cannot say that is the fact, nor can I say that it is not. It may well be that the
Accounting Standards Review Board has quite a different approach from the
historical approach. There may well be a case for less specific standards, but I think the
criticism in the paper really is directed to the existing standard-setting process, rather
than that which is presumed to be followed by the Accounting Standard Review
Board.
A comment on Michael Lulan’s point in relation to reporting by auditors (page
67): he seems to have a point. In fact, if auditors are not reporting under 5.285(10) on
the basis that it requires him to be satisfied, there has been a contravention of some
provision of the Code which cannot adequately be dealt with in the auditor’s report, it
may well be that we can do something with that by providing a less stringent test as he
suggests. In fact, rather than having the auditor needing to be satisfied of a
contravention he could if he has reason to believe, report that problem. I think he is
protected sufficiently at that point made in the last paragraph of Mr Lulan’s paper. I
think he is probably protected sufficiently under 5.330 as it presently is, which, in fact,
refers specifically to 5.285. That may be something which is worth looking at by the
advisers to the Minister with a view to adjusting sub-section (10). I would be interested
to hear if that would cause any particular problems if it were to happen.
There are a couple of points Murray Wells (page 71) raised — particularly, what is
the problem? Where is the public concern about independence, for instance? Well, let
us create some, if there isn’t any now. Perhaps there ought to be. I think that I
suggested previously that there had been very little discussion on that point in
Australia, and perhaps the reason why there is little discussion is that there is little
concern. Perhaps why there is little concern is because people do not realise that they
should be concerned. The fact is that in practically every investigation of a major
company that the Commission is involved in (and plenty of others too that relate to
smaller companies) there does seem to be this difficulty of the auditor having become
far too close to the officers of the company. He is more or less one of them. We have
had instances where the auditing firms occupy premises within the office of the
company or very close to it, which suggests certainly a lack of independence from the
client. If that is happening in fact, and the public is not concerned about it, then
perhaps it ought to be. It is a real problem. It has had plenty of airing in United States
where there is a considerable amount of public concern. If what is being stated by the
politicians in that country reﬂects that public concern then we can safely assume the
problem exists here even without our expressed public concern. It is no good saying
that it cannot be much of a problem because there is not much perceivable public
concern about it.
Peer Review. I can see it may or may not work. I do not know. It is obviously
costly, but the Americans seem to think that in terms of regulating the accountancy
profession it is the greatest thing since sliced bread. And if it is such a great thing as they
perceive it to be, and if their results are as they claim suggest that it has to be wonderful,
then the system here is not so very different, and it ought to be something that we
should think about.
J. O'Donnell
The area of independence interests me. Particularly I see any threat to
independence of the auditor as completely abhorrent. An auditor who cannot act fully
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independently or a situation where an auditor feels that he cannot carry out the job
completelyindependently, almost negates the whole purpose of having the audit. I am
very conscious of what Mr Rennie said, that Auditor-General is a very powerful
position It18 one where the auditor can be removed only by natural forces or by the
strength of both houses of parliament acting together So that it would be very easy for
me, as Auditor-General, to maintain independence
Tendering is one of these areas which produces a severe threat, whether it is
actively participated in by the profession or just put on by others. Perhaps it is
developed through ignorance, perhaps intentionally by some company managements,
and becomes accepted through ignorance of the consequence on the part of the public
and the auditing profession. Superfically tendering sounds a good idea. You can get
the same service for the cheapest price. I suppose it is all right if you are buying cheese,
because you can smell that and feel it, and see if it will suit your taste There are other
products of varying degrees, but I am sure few of us would want to go out to tender for
a brain surgeon and I see very little difference between going out to tender for a brain
surgeon or going out to tender for auditing duty It1s one where what you need13 a high
level of skill and a high degree of independence, and the marrying of those two.
The other aspect I wanted to comment on is the question of regulation. Mr
Cooke’s paper (page 13 to 20) asks can the profession regulate itself? That presupposes
that there is such a thing as a cohesive accounting profession. We have two
professional accounting bodies, and we have many people who do not belong to either
of those bodies. The essence of that problem, as Murray Wells pointed out, is that
anyone can call themselves an accountant. So that if the profession wanted to regulate,
it can only regulate so far as members of those two bodies are concerned.
With John Shields I had a term of penal servitude on the Public Accountants
Registration Board — it was the service on the board that was the penal servitude, not
the company of John Shields, because he is an excellent teller ofjokes and enlivened
our proceedings quite a lot. But one of the things which became evident there was that
complaints would be levelled or tendered against people for misbehaving (using the
word generally) as an accountant. These people, if they were not members of either of
the accounting bodies could not be disciplined by those bodies. So, how could those
bodies regulate their behaviour? As well as that they were not registered public
accountants and if the misbehaviour did not apply to something that was connected
with their position as a registered public accountant the Public Accountants
Registration Board could do nothing about it. I do think there is a very strong case that
if there is a need for regulation or control of the profession, you must provide someone,
be it the professional bodies or the Corporate Affairs Commission or whoever, with
the means of regulating and enforcing discipline. They must be able to apply those
rules to people offering accounting services, again not looking for a rigid deﬁnition,
and they must have a means of enforcing it. At the moment the two professional
bodies, even in their own disciplinary proceedings, must proceed very carefully at the
risk of legal proceedings against themselves by their members.
Chief Inspector Alan Sing
Since nobody has attacked my views on the effect of Baker -v- Campbelll can only
assume that everybody agrees with them and I must say I am very gratified. Moreover,
since nobody has disputed the guidelines I have laid down, I suppose I can look
forward to full co—operation from the professions next time I execute a search warrant
on your office.
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KJ. Rennie - ‘
I would take issue with Mr Shields on a couple of points. He suggested that it does
not really matter whether it is a primary or secondary responsibility for the auditor to
detect fraud. I would suggest that it matters a great deal. If as a profession we had a
primary responsibility to detect fraud, our entire audit programme and procedures
would be geared to that end. Whereas, the reality is, that those procedures and
programs are designed to carry out the audit as we understand it, and in the process to
have an awareness of the possibility of fraud and to detect it if that is possible. I think
that is far different to the primary responsibility to detect fraud.
I trained as an auditor a very long time ago, and in those days audits were very
different to what they are now. It was basically a question of checking virtually every
transaction in the records, and while the audits were, therefore, very tedious and time
consuming they did tend to uncover more instances of fraud than they do now. But I
am afraid the realities of life and the movement of the profession’s views on just how
audits should be conducted with the emphasis on internal control mean that those
methods of detecting fraud, as previously used, just do not apply in today’s world.
Mr Shields spoke of six qualities and I would like to say that, in my experience,
those six qualities are very much in evidence with the great majority of professional
accountants in this country today. He talked about the question of the surgeon
conducting an appendix removal, and suggested that there was a parallel between that
person and the auditor. I think, with respect, that that is an unfair parallel. If I have
forty or fifty partners around Australia, and if I employ in the process of doing audits
several hundred people, it is quite different to expect the auditor to be responsible for
the losses caused by perhaps one error ofjudgment by one of these people in the course
of conducting his duties. 'I am sure, as a surgeon, I would be quite happy to take
responsibility for the removal of the appendix and anything that went wrong in that
process, but I ask is it fair for me to be responsible for any error ofjudgment by anyone
of several hundred people in the course of conduct of an audit? This emphasizes the
matter I referred to in my paper, i.e. the necessity of educating people in order to reduce
the gap between the public’s perception ofwhat is involved in an audit and the reality of
it as understood by the accounting profession.
Professor Wells referred to the question of tendering and asked why do audit firms
tender —— “if you do not like the heat, get out of the kitchen”. There is a very simple
answer. I abhor tendering as a practice but the fact of the matter is that I do get
involved in it and my firm does. The reason is that we have to find some food to take
into the kitchen to cook, and if you have a client which may be worth several tens of
thousands of dollars, and the client says he wishes to go to tender, I do not see that in
commercial reality you can do anything other than tender. The excesses that have been
produced by that process are what I particularly dislike. We have in the world today a
great problem for the accounting profession and that is to balance their professional
pride with the commercial drive that people seem to be wanting to instil into the
profession. We have had a relaxation of our marketing and advertising rules and it is
quite evident to me that people in their commercial pursuits surrender some of their
professional pride. I personally do not like it, but I also do not see the answer to it.
Mr Mayne said there is a lack of skills in the profession on the question of EDP
technology. It may be the case with some accountants. I would suggest that there is
considerable degree of skill in most, if not all, of the major firms in this country and a
considerable amount of resources devoted to increasing that knowledge.
Mr Cooke’s paper dealt first of all with the question of peer reviews. I must say that
certainly the professional bodies have been and are considering the question of peer
reviews. It is the cost-benefit equation which causes the greatest difficulty. Perhaps
that will have more meaning when I say that some of the initial individual firms
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peer reviews in the United States have cost in excess of a million dollars. That cost has
to be borne somewhere and the only place that it can be really effectively borne is by the
clients of those firms. It is not an easy solution to suggest that peer reviews will solve a
lot of our problems. They may well do, but I am not convinced yet that the benefit will
be there for the cost involved.
Mr O’Donnell referred to the tide of crime. I really do not see the evidence of a tide
of crime. I am aware that there is corporate fraud, and I am aware that it is fairly
widespread. In fact, reference has been made to RA. Irish’s famous text book on
auditing which has been quoted, and in one notable judgment quoted from an
outdated edition, and having ploughed through that textbook when I was studying
auditing I found one very memorable line in it, and that was “Fraud, like sex, is
ubiquitous”. I think the question raised by Mr O‘Donnell on the social accountability
of accountants is a very interesting one. Certainly, this area is being developed more
rapidly in continental Europe, particularly in the Netherlands, where social accounting
is becoming, if not mandatory, much more prevalent. The Institute and the Society
here have run seminars on the subject, and there is an increasing awareness of the
desirability of it. But, again, we get back to the question of cost and who will bear the
cost. I would like to think that there was a solution to that, because, I think there is a
social responsibility the profession could well meet. I do wonder though at the question
posed by Mr O’Donnell about the auditor finding that the waste disposal is being
siphoned off into some river. Just where that would leave the auditor in his relationship
with the people who appointed him, is certainly a very interesting question.
Ron Hooper
This is a question to Mr Rennie. You have not answered Mr Lulan’s question and I
am wondering if you would be able to do that? And secondly, when talking of
tendering, you suggested that commercial reality and professionalism meet. Could you
tell us what suffers at that point?
K.J. Rennie
I am sorry I did not refer to Mr Lulan’s question.l Certainly I can see some merit in
the auditor having an easier path to the Corporate Affairs Commission. I think it has
probably exercised the mind of many auditors in the past as to whether a particular set
of circumstances warrant disclosure under 5.285 (10). In most cases, I would expect
and suspect that the auditor would seek legal advice if he thought there .was a
possibility of a 8.285 (10) report being required. If he did not seek legal advice I would
suggest that he would leave himself open to some criticism. The danger, though, that I
see with making it mandatory or easier for the auditor to report is the danger of
infringing the natural justice rights of the people on whom he is reporting.
I find it a bit difficult in concept to have a professional relationship with a client
and to marry that with the thought of going to the Corporate Affairs Commission
every time you suspect something is amiss. I can only say that if this section is to work
more effectively it has got to be spelled out more explicitly just what the auditor should
do. I think that he probably requires a little more protection in the aftermath of such a
reporting. Almost invariably it would probably lead to loss of the auditjob, and so we
get back to the question of independence again. Not that that should preclude the
auditor making such a report. In summary the legislation could be strengthened, but
there is some danger that natural justice will not prevail.
1. See page 67, para. 6. “whether or not the legislation should be changed to make it easier for auditors to
report to the Commission".
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On the question of what suffers when commercial drive comes into conﬂict with
professional pride I am sorry to say that in some cases I think that professional pride
has suffered, perhaps more so in America than here. But, I would like to think that in
the great majority of cases professional pride does prevail. I would certainly do
anything in my power to ensure that that continued to happen.
Jim Priddice, NSW State Chairman of the Institute of Chartered Accountants
1 am a little disappointed that we appear to have come to the end of these
proceedings without, perhaps, any discussion of the notion of limitation of liability. I
certainly do not think that the official position of the professional bodies is that they
want to avoid liability as much‘as limit it to a practical amount, an amount which can _
be provided against, and which would be a reasonable thing both from the point of
view of the consumer of the services, as well as the person attempting to carry out the
services. It would seem to me that that is one of the crucial issues we ought to be
addressing. I think that many people would agree that they do not want to let the
auditors off the hook entirely in some of these instances; they would nevertheless like
to feel that the auditor has a responsible attitude and has taken some practical steps in
relation to the degree of liability commercially that he should assume.
P. W. Wolnizer, Department of Accounting, The University of Sydney.
I do not wish to answer Mr Priddice’s question directly, but I do have a comment
on it. We have heard a lot about the independence of auditors, and, of course, the
conventional wisdom is that if we can remove auditors from the inﬂuence and control
of clients and client managers, then the products of the auditor’s work, known as the
audited accounts, will be more credible, more objective, and more reliable. So we have
proceeded down the path of regulation in this area. First of all, we have independence,
this wonderful thing called the state of mind which is indeterminate, of course. Then we
thought we had better operationalise the idea, and we said that we should have
financial independence, familial independence, and various notions of organizational
independence. Of late, we have talked about restricting the kind of non-audit services
that might be provided to audit clients. We talk about Peer Review, we talk about
Corporate Audit Committees, and all of these things. Until we get to the end of the line
and say perhaps we should not have private auditors at all, perhaps the solution lies in
having government auditors.
Might I suggest that that is no solution at all, because there is a far more
substantial point at issue. The issue is not in terms of some indeterminate relationship
between auditors, their clients and client managers. The substantive issue is the same as
that which obtains injudicial processes, namely, the independence of the evidence that
the auditor may have recourse to in the conduct of his audit. The end point of any idea
of independence is the notion of professional or independent judgment. An
independent judgment pre-supposes that the auditor, in forming his opinion, has
recourse to evidence which is beyond the control of the inﬂuence of clients and clients’
managers. If the independence which the auditor has recourse to is not of that kind
then we will never have an independent audit.
It seems to me that this is where accounting standards are rather important.
Because of conventional wisdom once again, it has been suggested that wevovercome
this problem by having more and more standards. But might I suggest that in a number
of cases with existing accounting standards, that the products of the application of
those standards is the incorporation into accounts of the private judgments of
managers. In other words, the accounts have the character of private knowledge,
statements for which the audit has no recourse to evidence of an independent or
corroborative kind. If we have more standards, which generate more and more private
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judgments in accounts, thenm we have more regulation but we do not have
corroborative statements. Nor do we have auditors functioning as independent
authenticators.
That brings me to another point, in relation to Mr Priddice’s issue. It seems that if
managers have defacto the right to incorporate into accounts private judgments or
judgments which are not independently corroborable by auditors, then the balance of
accounting power is misplaced. It is imbalanced, because as the preparers of accounts,
the directors and managers and other company officials have the right of determining
primarily what goes into accounts, and so the auditors are in somewhat an invidious
position come the time to audit. Of course, the auditors have sought to limit their
responsibilities in a number of ways. For example, auditors used once to attest to the .
truth and correctness of accounts and used to certify as such. Now, they merely issue an
opinion on the result of an examination. Auditors once used to talk about vertiﬁcation
of accounts. Now they talk about examining the accounts. Auditors once accepted
responsibility for the detection of fraud in accounts, they now disclaim that
responsibility. So, there may be some things which might be interpreted as attempts to
limit the liability of auditors, but whether that has succeeded in the legal context, I
think remains to be demonstrated.
J. C. Cooke
Could I just make one point in relation to the independence question? It seems to
me that all the independent evidence in the world that the auditor might have to rely
upon might not be of much effect if the auditor himself is not, in fact, independent from
the company officers. For instance, if he is sailing every weekend with the directors of
the company and this independent evidence is provided to him it might not necessarily
induce him to make much use of it. I think the question of independence is of some
importance, not merely to be swept aside on the basis that it will not make an
difference. I think it does make a lot of difference. -
Dr. Robert J. Stein, Faculty of Law, The University of Sydney.
I was the convenor of the seminar this evening and having listened to some of the
comments from the ﬂoor I have become more horrified after my reading from what I
have heard. , ‘
The accountancy profession, it seems to me, must be one of the few professions
which seems almost to be able to excuse its liability by the use of a series of phrases such
as: “It’s too difficult” or “We can only check on the information which we have been
given to check upon” and so on. If it were the legal profession, we have already
established a committee which upon inquiry after complaint can fine, dismiss, refer to
the court and have imprisoned those people who do not carry out their function as
solicitors or as barristers as the law requires. I cannot believe, thatyou as a profession,
accountants, have not established, in a like way, one body which has the sanction ofthe
law behind it, who can discipline, dismiss, fine or refer to a court of competent
jurisdiction the behaviour of one of your members which has brought into absolute
disgrace, disdain and loss, not only your profession, but the people for whom they are
acting.
It seems to me, that a profession which can seek tojustify its inability to do that by
saying, “We cannot check on ourselves” “We haven’t the means of doing it”, “It will
cost too much money” “This must be carried or passed on to our clients", is seeking to
find justification in absurdity. It is sufﬁcient for the legal profession and the medical
profession to be able to do it, I cannot believe that the accountancy profession cannot
do so likewise. And, if it cannot, perhaps the Chairman of the Corporate Affairs
Commission was right at lunch, when he said to me “Perhaps it might well be that the
 
  
79
Commission, as others have suggested, will have to regulate the accountancy
profession itself”. No one has answered these difficultues. No one has directed
comments at it. How can you as professional people say that you have a right to limit
by incorporation your liability to people who use and ‘rely on your services for the
incompetence ofyour own actions, that you will be responsible only to a certain figure?
It would be impossible for any lawyer to do that. The legal profession is responsible to
the full extent of the individual’s capacity to pay. You have to be able and willing to
place your professional expertise on the line, your substance down to the last cent, to
earn or gain any respect whatsoever and the legal profession, which is being attacked at
every turning, is prepared to do that. It has not been able to seek incorporation to
protect itself from its responsibilities to the people who use it and to the people who
rely upon it. And I would be only too anxious to hear Mr Rennie, or anyone else, try
and put aside the accusation that your profession has done next to nothing to regulate
itself. What is it going to do about it, and how can it dare to hide behind the thesis of
incorporation to do so?
I am sorry if I have been provocative, but those are the things which appeal to me
as a lawyer. I cannot escape it, why should you?
J. O’Donnell .
I think Robert Stein answered his own question. The reason why the legal
profession can control itself is because you cannot practice as a solicitor unless you are
properly registered and controlled. You cannot practice as a barrister unless the court
has admitted you as a barrister. You cannot practice in the medical profession, unless
you have gone through the right steps.
It is a problem that was referred to on a number of occasions. First, the
accountancy profession is not ’just one cohesive profession.‘.~'Second, those two
professional bodies that do exist cannot do any more.than/discipline their own
members. What is needed is to put the accountancy profession in the same position as
the legal profession and the medical profession, then the accountancy profession
would have a chance to discipline. Time and again, the accounting bodies will take the
most extreme action they can against one of their members which is to terminate the
membership. That person can then just open up a shop next door and describerhimself
as an accountant or an auditor without any impunity and no action possible against
him. ’
I do not know the answer to limited liability but, certainly, the fact that there is no
limit on the liability is the essence of the problem. I think it is a situation where the
punishment does not fit the crime. Is it just a civil matter if an auditor has been
negligent or careless? You perhaps consider a different system where you make it a
criminal matter and impose a more realistic penalty to ensure that there is motivation
for auditors to act properly.
K.J. Rennie
I would just like to assure Dr Stein that the accounting profession in this country
has gone to considerable lengths to discipline its members and to regulate itself. Both
the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Australian Society of Accountants
have very well defined and regulated procedures for disciplining their members. They
do, in fact, discipline them, they dismiss them, they fine them. The processes are not
dissimilar to courts of law. There has been much legal advice sought on the ways in
which we do discipline our members and happily the frequency is not as great as people
might think, but the Institute and the Society’s journals each month give details of
those cases where members have been disciplined.
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I might mention that one of the main difficulties we labour under, at times, is the
sub judice rule which applies and which has exercised our minds at enormous length
over many years. This difficulty is quite often evidenced when we become aware of a
company failure. I can assure you, that as soon as such a failure occurs, or as soon as a
complaint is lodged by a member of the public (and members of the public write and
phone us frequently), those complaints are investigated quite often much more quickly
than some of the other regulatory authorities are able to move. Perhaps because we
have more ﬂexibility. Quite often, however, we get to an advanced stage of our
procedures, which are firstly, to go through an investigation committee and then to a
formal disciplinary hearing, when the lawyer orbarrister for the member who has been
accused or charged with an offence says that the matter is now subjudice because civil
or criminal legal action has begun. Then we have this dreadful hiatus period which can
go on in some cases for ten or twelve years. We have a couple of cases on our books that
have been going for several years and this does leave us open to criticism. The public
says what has the accounting profession done about disciplining this member? The
short answer is that we have gone as far as we can go, but we cannot go any further until
the courts decide one way or the other on the matter.
This is a source of great frustration to us, because in many cases we feel that the
profession would be better off if a particular member was excluded from membership
or fined and the case referred to the appropriate authority. But in many cases we have
our hands tied very effectively and its the subjudice rule which ties them. In those cases
where the subjudice rule does not apply I can assure you that We certainly attempt to
move with all due vigour to discipline and dismiss members who are guilty of breaches
of our regulations or ethical rulings, and we are only too keen to weed out those
individuals who are responsible for those acts.
J. C. Cooke
I would like to say something in response to one comment Robert Stein made. If I
did advocate that the Corporate Affairs Commission take over the role of regulating
the accounting profession it must have been a very good lunch! You will notice in my
paper, that I have made reference to the former Attorney-General. Frank Walker’s
comment in relation to accounting standards. I quote him as saying, “I shudder to
think of what will happen to our market place if bureaucrats were empowered to set
accounting standards” (page 19). I do not know what he would do at the very thought
of bureaucrats being empowered to control a profession in the way that I might have
suggested, but I deny it. .
Jim Priddice
One of the interesting aspects of the accountancy profession, of course, is that
there has been a form of regulation for many, many years. Mr Shields mentioned his
membership of the Public Accountants Registration Board. That Board has-been
going since 1945 in New South Wales and has had the ability of preventing any of us
auditors exercising our auditorial function, as it were, in respect of certain entities. In
more recent years there has been the Company Auditors Board and the Company
Liquidators Board, so there is already a good deal of regulatory mechanism in place.
Now, I am not sure if Dr Stein is saying that those agencies have been guilty of neglect
in not prosecuting those matters which they should have prosecuted.
Dr Robert Stein
You have made it rather difficult. I should first say that with members of the legal
profession, who carry practicing certificates, a large portion of the cost of their
practicing certificates goes to the fidelity fund, as I understand it. My comments were
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more directly aimed at the comments in the papers, which tended to suggest that it was
extremely difficult for the profession to regulate itself. It was my view that a profession
can successfully regulate itself, given that the unfortunate position which Mr Rennie
points out does not pertain. It seems to me that, a structure can be set up so that
disciplinary functions be carried out, without the proceedings beingdrawn out to an
inordinate length, because of the threat of a writ, or the fact that a writ has been issued.
It seems to me, that to hide behind that fact, is to suggest that the accountancy
profession has not taken steps to ensure that it can more successfully control the
proceedings, which it says it is doing the best it can to control. I do not think it is, it
could do more. I suppose we can all do more. But the legal profession has to do more,
and so does the medical profession. I cannot see why the accountancy profession
cannot do more.
In the professional bodies that you have, you may well have been doing the best
you can, but the tools which are available to you may be inadequate.
Professor Murray Wells, Graduate School of Management & Public Policy,
The University of Sydney.
I was a convenor of a working party within the profession that has been attempting
for a number of years to have brought into effect an Accountants and Auditors Bill.
The very point of that, and the thing which has frustrated us for some four or five years
now, is that we were attempting to deal with the matter that Mr O’Donnell raised, that
is to bring within the ambit of the disciplinary proceedings all those people who
practice as accountants but who do not belong to one or other of the professional
bodies, or who are not registered with the Public Accountants Registration Board. We
wanted to bring them within the ambit of the disciplinary proceedings and make it
impossible for people who were not qualified, not covered by those proceedings,
calling themselves accountants.
Secondly, and actually much more importantly, the proposed Bill contained
within it, provisions that go to the very heart of what has just been said, i.e. we wanted
the power to be able to act against accountants without having to wait until court cases
that have been stringing on for years come to finality. Our only result of our attempts
within that working party have really been total frustration. We tried to mount it at the
state level, we were told it was a federal matter. We went to the federal level and were
told that it was a state matter. Within the state, we were then told that something else
was coming up, other amendments to another Act, which would cover most of the
matter. Of course, they do not. All I can say is, that I share entirely the frustration of
my colleague.
Professor Brent Fisse, Director, Institute of Criminology, The University of Sydney.
My deviant mind turns back to the topic of legal professional privilege. It strikes
me that this is going to be an extremely important topic in practice, if it is not already
one. I say that because of the fairly widespread school of thought in the United States
that legal professional privilege is relatively easy to enjoy in such a way as to effectively
immunise sensitive information within companies, or within professions for that
matter, and that it is relatively easy to structure communications within companies, or
to structure communications within an accounting firm or legal firm, so as to attract
the operation of legal professional privilege.
Now, I wonder, to what extent the penny has dropped on the Australian scene,
that if one is sufficiently adroit, can communications be structured in such a way as to
“satisfy” the requirements of Baker -v- Campbell relating to legal professional privilege
and thereby, in a very real way, obstruct the processes of criminal investigation? I
would appreciate any comments that Chief Inspector Alan Sing has to offer on that.
82
Chief Inspector Sing
So far as I am aware there is no evidence in this country that the penny has
dropped. I think the day after Baker -v- Campbell was decided we executed a search
warrant on a firm of solicitors in Sydney. Certainly they were aware of the decision,
and their immediate reaction was to claim legal professional privilege in respect of
everything in their ofﬁce. Quite clearly that is an absurd claim because the scope of
legal professional privilegeIs very limited and it only applies to two particular classes
of documents, i. e. communications for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice,
and documents brought into existence for the sole purpose of use in anticipated or
current litigation.
The guidelines that I have set out in my paper are designed to reach a consensus
with the person maintaining the claim about what sort of documents can in fact be
privileged. I would think that it is not necessary in every case for a police ofﬁcer to hang
his hat on the loophole (if you would like to call it that) that I have identified, i.e. that a
claim made outside the courtroom is not conclusive of the existence of the privilege.
Therefore, a police officer who wanted to exercise the full authority of his search
warrant could simply bulldoze over a claim and make an inspection of those
documents and, in fact, seize them. Notwithstanding the merits of the claim, I think
that if you wanted to take an extreme view, a police officer would in fact be within the
law as laid down in Baker -v- Campbell, by doing that. But I do not think that is
necessary. I think provided that the professions are prepared to enter into negotiations
with a police officer, and show him sufficient parts of the document to satisfy him that
the document is, in fact, a privileged document, then any sensible police officer would
be prepared to accept that the document is privileged. For example, if it is a legal
opinion which was brought into existence after the commission of the offence or
offences alleged on the search warrant, then it is difficult to conceive of circumstances
whereby that opinion could be used, for example to facilitate the commission of the
offence on the warrant.
It is, of course, conceivable that a devious solicitor could post-date his opinions to
insure himself against the documents being seized during a search, by showing the date
on the advice to the police ofﬁcer, in an attempt to convince him that the opinion was
brought into existence after the offence. I have no knowledge of that device ever having
been used and I would advise all present not to use it because if I were to discover that
that device had been used I would have no hesitation in preferring suitable charges
against the person who used it.
So, finally, I think that there is certainly room for negotiations between police
ofﬁcers and the professions outside the courtroom to act reasonably and sensibly to
resolve these disputes withou the need for litigation. I am sure that certainly 99% of the
members of the profession are honest in their dealings with their clients and they have
nothing to fear from the police if they are, in fact, honest and sincere in their approach
to these disputes.
A.J. Restuccia, State Crown Solicitor’s Ofﬁce, Attorney-General’s Department.
I would like to raise a small point to overcome a frustration on one point and to
offer some good tidings to Mr Rennie.
Recent decisions in late 1984 by Mr Justice Enderby, and Mr Justice Rogers“ gave
some clear encouragement to the Medical Investigations that had been commenced
‘. Bailey -v- Investigating Committee constituted under the Medical Practitioners Act; Enderby J. 7
December 1984 ;
Eastgate -v- Investigating Committee. Rogers J. 24 July 1984.
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into the activities of certain psychiatrists at Chelmsford Hospital. The outcome of
those decisions made it quite clear that there were limits, and the final result was that
those investigations of that particular committee hearings which had been frustrated
for some time were able to continue. My only suggestion, therefore, is that if the
accounting profession does have frustrations, it may seek assistance of the Supreme
Court in its Administrative Law Division. '
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